Mr. Locke's
LETTER
TO THE
Biſhop of *Worceſter.*

A LETTER

To the Right Reverend

Edward L^d Biſhop of *Worceſter*,

Concerning ſome

PASSAGES

RELATING TO

Mr. LOCKE's Eſſay

OF

Humane Underſtanding:

IN A LATE

Diſcourſe of his Lordſhips,

IN

Vindication of the Trinity.

By *JOHN LOCKE*, Gent.

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A LETTER TO THE Biſhop of *Worceſter*, &c.

My Lord,

I Cannot but look upon it as a great Honour that your Lordſhip, who are ſo throughly acquainted with the incomparable Writings of Antiquity, and know ſo well how to Entertain your Self with the Great Men in the Commonwealth of Letters, ſhould at any time take into your Hand my mean Papers; and ſo far beſtow any of

your valuable Minutes on my *Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, as to let the World ſee you have thought my Notions worth your Lordſhips Conſideration. My Aim in that, as well as every thing elſe written by me, being purely to follow Truth as far as I could diſcover it, I think my ſelf beholden to whoever ſhews me my Miſtakes, as to one who, concurring in my Deſign, helps me forward in my way.

Your Lordſhip has been pleaſed to favour me with ſome Thoughts of yours in this kind, in your late *Learned Diſcourſe in Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity*, and I hope I may ſay, have gone a little out of your way to do me that Kindneſs; for the Obligation is thereby the greater. And if your Lordſhip has brought in the mention of my Book in a Chapter, Entituled, *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon, anſwer'd*; when in my whole Eſſay, I think there is not to be found any think like an Objection againſt the Trinity, I have the more to acknowledge to your Lordſhip, who would

would not let the Foreigneſs of the Subject hinder your Lordſhip from endeavouring to ſet me right, as to ſome Errors your Lordſhip apprehends in my Book; when other Writers uſing ſome Notions like mine, gave you that which was occaſion enough for you to do me the Favour to take notice of what you diſlike in my *Eſſay*.

Your Lordſhips Name is of ſo great Authority in the Learned World, that I who profeſs my ſelf more ready upon Conviction to recant, than I was at firſt to publiſh my Miſtakes, cannot pay that Reſpect is due to it, without telling the Reaſons why I ſtill retain any of my Notions, after your Lordſhips having appeared diſſatisfied with them. This muſt be my Apology; and I hope ſuch an one as your Lordſhip will allow, for my Examining what you have Printed againſt ſeveral Paſſages in my Book, and my ſhewing the Reaſons why it has not prevailed with me to quit them.

That your Lordſhips Reaſonings may loſe none of their Force by my

miſapprehending or miſrepreſenting them, (a way too familiarly uſed in Writings that have any appearance of Controverſie) I ſhall crave leave to give the Reader your Lordſhips Arguments in the full Strength of your own Expreſſions, that ſo in them he may have the advantage to ſee the Deficiency of my Anſwers, in any Point where I ſhall be ſo unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow the Light your Lordſhip affords me.

Your Lordſhip having in the two or three preceding Pages, juſtly, as I think, found Fault with the account of Reaſon, given by the Unitarians and a late Writer, in thoſe Paſſages you quote out of them; and then coming to the *Nature of Subſtance*, p. 233. and relating what that Author has ſaid concerning the Minds getting of ſimple Ideas, and thoſe ſimple Ideas being the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſonings, your Lordſhip thus concludes, *p.* 234.

Then it follows, That we can have no Foundation of Reaſoning, where there can

can be no ſuch Ideas from Senſation or Reflection.

Now this is the Caſe of Subſtance; it is not intromitted by the Senſes, nor depends upon the Operation of the Mind; and ſo it cannot be within the compaſs of our Reaſon. And therefore I do not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning, have almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World. For they not only tell us, &c.

This, as I remember, is the firſt place where your Lordſhip is pleaſed to quote any thing out of my *Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, which your Lordſhip does in theſe Words following.

" That we can have no Idea of it P. 234.
" by Senſation or Reflection; but
" that nothing is ſignified by it, only
" an uncertain Suppoſition of we
" know not what. *And therefore it is parallel'd more than once, with the* Indian Philoſophers. " He knew not
" what; which ſupported the Tor-
" toiſe, that ſupported the Elephant,
" that ſupported the Earth; ſo Sub-
" ſtance was found out only to ſup-
" port Accidents. And, that when

" we

" we talk of Subſtances, we talk " like Children; who being ask'd a " Queſtion about ſomewhat which " they knew not, readily give this " ſatisfactory Anſwer, That it is " ſomething.

Theſe Words of mine your Lordſhip brings to prove that I am one of *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning, that have almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* An Accuſation which your Lordſhip will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, becauſe I do not underſtand what is *almoſt to diſcard Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* If your Lordſhip means by it, That I deny or doubt that there is in the World any ſuch Thing as Subſtance, that your Lordſhip will acquit me of, when your Lordſhip looks again into that Chapter, which you have cited more than once, where your Lordſhip will find theſe Words.

Humane Underſtanding. B. 2. C. 23. §. 4.

" When we talk or think of any " particular ſort of Corporeal Sub- " ſtances, as Horſe, Stone, *&c.* " tho' the Idea we have of either of " them,

" them, be but the Complication or
" Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple
" Ideas of ſenſible Qualities, which
" we uſe to find united in the thing
" called Horſe or Stone; yet becauſe
" we cannot conceive how they
" ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in
" another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting
" in, and ſupported by ſome common
" Subject, which Support we denote
" by the name Subſtance; tho' it be
" certain, we have no clear or diſtinct
" Idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a
" Support. And again,

" The ſame happens concerning §. 5.
" the Operations of the Mind, *viz.*
" Thinking, Reaſoning, Fearing, *&c.*
" which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt
" of themſelves, nor apprehending
" how they can belong to Body, or
" be produced by it, we are apt to
" think theſe the Actions of ſome
" other Subſtance, which we call
" Spirit, whereby yet it is evident,
" that having no other Idea or Notion
" of Matter, but ſomething wherein
" thoſe many ſenſible Qualities,
" which affect our Senſes, do ſubſiſt;
" by ſuppoſing a Subſtance, wherein

" Think-

" Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, " and a Power of Moving, *&c.* do " ſubſiſt. We have as clear a Noti- " on of the Nature or Subſtance of " Spirit, as we have of Body; the " one being ſuppoſed to be (with- " out knowing what it is) the *Sub-* " *ſtratum* to thoſe ſimple Ideas we " have from without; and the other " ſuppoſed (with a like Ignorance of " what it is) to be the *Subſtratum* to " thoſe Operations, which we expe- " riment in our ſelves within. And again,

§. 6. " Whatever therefore be the ſecret " Nature of Subſtance in general, all " the Ideas we have of particular di- " ſtinct Subſtances, are nothing but " ſeveral Combinations of ſimple " Ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' un- " known, Cauſe of their Union, as " makes the whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf.

And I further ſay in the ſame Sect. " That we ſuppoſe theſe Combinati- " ons to reſt in and to be adherent to " that unknown, common Subject, " which inheres not in any Thing " elſe. And that our Complex " Ideas of Subſtances, beſides all

" thoſe

" thoſe ſimple Ideas they are made
" up of, have always the confuſed
" Idea of ſomething to which they
" belong, and in which they ſubſiſt;
" and therefore when we ſpeak of
" any ſort of Subſtance, we ſay it is
" a thing having ſuch and ſuch Qua-
" lities; a Body is a thing that is ex-
" tended, figured and capable of
" Motion; a Spirit, a thing capable
" of Thinking.

Theſe, and the like Faſhions of Speaking intimate, That the Subſtance is ſuppoſed *always ſomething*, beſides the Extention, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other obſervable Idea, though we know not what it is.

" Our Idea of Body, *I ſay*, is an ex- B. 2. c. 23.
" tended, ſolid Subſtance; and our Idea §. 22.
" of our Souls, is of a Subſtance that
" thinks. So that as long as there is any ſuch thing as Body or Spirit in the World, I have done nothing towards the *diſcarding Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World.* Nay, as long as there is any ſimple Idea or ſenſible Quality left, according to my way of Arguing, Subſtance cannot be

be diſcarded, becauſe all ſimple Ideas, all ſenſible Qualities, carry with them a Suppoſition of a *Subſtratum* to exiſt in, and of a Subſtance wherein they inhere; and of this that whole Chapter is ſo full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have *almoſt*, or one jot *diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World*. And of this *Man*, *Horſe*, *Sun*, *Water*, *Iron*, *Diamond*, &c. which I have mentioned of diſtinct ſorts of *Subſtances*, will be my Witneſſes as long as any ſuch thing remain in being, of which I ſay, "That the Ideas of Subſtances B. 2. c. 12. §. 6. "are ſuch Combinations of ſimple "Ideas, as are taken to repreſent di-"ſtinct, particular Things, ſubſiſt-"ing by themſelves, in which the "ſuppos'd or confus'd Idea of Sub-"ſtance is always the firſt and "Chief.

If by almoſt *diſcarding Subſtance out of the reaſonable part of the World*, your Lordſhip means, That I have deſtroyed, and *almoſt diſcarded* the true Idea we have of it, by calling it a *Subſtratum*, *A Suppoſition of we know* B. 2. c. 23. §. 1. *not what Support of ſuch Qualities as*

are

are capable of producing ſimple Ideas in us, an obſcure and relative Idea. That without knowing what it is, it is that which ſupports Accidents, ſo that of Subſtance we have no Idea of what it is, but only a confus'd, obſcure one, of what it does. I muſt confeſs this, and the like I have ſaid of our Idea of Subſtance; and ſhould be very glad to be convinced by your Lordſhip, or any Body elſe, that I have ſpoken too meanly of it. He that would ſhew me a more clearer and diſtinct Idea of Subſtance, would do me a Kindneſs I ſhould thank him for. But this is the beſt I can hitherto find, either in my own Thoughts, or in the Books of Logicians; for their Account or Idea of it is, that it is *Ens* or *res per ſe ſubſiſtens & ſubſtans accidentibus*; which in effect is no more but that Subſtance is a *Being* or *Thing*; or in ſhort, *ſomething* they know not what, or of which they have no clearer Idea, than that it is *ſomething* which ſupports Accidents, or other ſimple Ideas or Modes, and is not ſupported it ſelf as a Mode or an Accident. So that I do not ſee but *Burgerſdicius*, *San-*

§. 2. §. 3. B. 2. c. 13. §. 19.

Sanderſon, and the whole Tribe of Logicians, muſt be reckon'd with *the Gentlemen of this new way of Reaſoning, who have almoſt diſcarded* Subſtance *out of the reaſonable part of the World.*

But ſuppoſing, my Lord, that I or theſe Gentlemen, Logicians of Note in the Schools, ſhould own, That we have a very imperfect, obſcure, inadequate Idea of Subſtance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with diſcarding Subſtance out of the World? For what *almoſt* diſcarding and *reaſonable part* of the World ſignifies, I muſt confeſs I do not clearly comprehend: But let *almoſt* and *reaſonable part* ſignifie here what they will, for I dare ſay your Lordſhip meant ſomething by them, would not your Lordſhip think you were a little hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging your ſelf to have a very imperfect and inadequate Idea of God, or of ſeveral other things which in this very Treatiſe, you confeſs our Underſtandings come ſhort in and cannot comprehend, you ſhould be accuſed to be one of theſe *Gentlemen that*

that have almoſt diſcarded God, or thoſe other Myſterious Things whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate Ideas, *out of the reaſonable World?* For I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means by *almoſt diſcarding out of the reaſonable World*, ſomething that is blameable, for it ſeems not to be inſerted for a Commendation; and yet I think he deſerves no Blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obſcure Ideas, where he has no better; however, if it be inferr'd from thence, that either he *almoſt excludes* thoſe Things out of Being, or out of rational Diſcourſe, if that be meant by the *reaſonable World*, for the firſt of theſe will not hold, becauſe the Being of Things in the World depends not on our Ideas: The latter indeed is true, in ſome degree, but is no Fault; for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confus'd, obſcure Ideas, we cannot Diſcourſe and Reaſon about thoſe Things ſo well, fully and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear and diſtinct Ideas.

Your Lordſhip I muſt own, with great Reaſon, takes notice that I *parallel'd more than once* our Idea of Subſtance, with the *Indian* Philoſopher's He knew not what which ſupported the Tortoiſe, *&c.*

This Repetition is, I confeſs, a Fault in exact Writing: But I having acknowledg'd and excus'd it in theſe Words in my Preface; "I am "not ignorant how little I herein "conſult my own Reputation, when "I knowingly let my Eſſay go with "a Fault ſo apt to diſguſt the *moſt* "*Judicious, who are always* the niceſt "Readers. And there further add, "That I did not publiſh my Eſſay "for ſuch great Maſters of Know-"ledge as your Lordſhip; but fitted "it to Men of my own Size, to "whom Repetitions might be ſome-"times uſeful. It would not therefore have been beſides your Lordſhips Generoſity (who were not intended to be provoked by this Repetition) to have paſſed by ſuch a Fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower Rank of Writers. But I ſee your Lordſhip would have me exact and

and without any Faults; and I wiſh I could be ſo, the better to deſerve your Lordſhips Approbation.

My Saying, " That when we " talk of Subſtance, we talk like " Children; who being ask'd a " Queſtion about ſomething, which " they know not, readily give this " ſatisfactory Anſwer, That it is " ſomething; your Lordſhip ſeems mightily to lay to Heart, in theſe Words that follow.

If this be the Truth of the Caſe, we muſt ſtill talk like Children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational Idea of Subſtance, we can have no Principle of Certainty to go upon in this Debate. P. 235.

If your Lordſhip has any better and diſtincter Idea of Subſtance than mine is, which I have given an Account of, your Lordſhip is not at all concern'd in what I have there ſaid. But thoſe whoſe Idea of *Subſtance*, whether a *rational* or not rational Idea, is like mine, ſomething he knows not what, muſt in that, with me, talk like Children, when they ſpeak of ſomething they know not

what. For a Philoſopher that ſays, That which ſupports Accidents is *ſomething* he knows not what; and a Country-man that ſays, The Foundation of the great Church at *Harlem*, is ſupported by *ſomething* he knows not what; and a Child that ſtands in the Dark upon his Mothers Muff, and ſays he ſtands upon *ſomething* he knows not what, in this reſpect talk all Three alike. But if the Country-man knows, that the Foundation of the Church at *Harlem* is ſupported by a Rock, as the Houſes about *Briſtol* are; or by Gravel, as the Houſes about *London* are; or by Wooden Piles, as the Houſes in *Amſterdam* are; it is plain, that then having a clear and diſtinct Idea of the thing that ſupports the Church, he does not talk of this Matter as a Child; nor will he of the Support of Accidents, when he has a clearer and more diſtinct Idea of it, than that it is barely *ſomething*. But as long as we think like Children, in Caſes where our Ideas are no clearer nor diſtincter than theirs, I agree with your Lordſhip, *That I*

know

know not how it can be remedied, but that we muſt talk like them.

Your Lordſhips next Paragraph begins thus. *I do not ſay, That we* P. 235. *can have a clear Idea of Subſtance, either by Senſation or Reflection; but from hence I argue, That this is a very inſufficient diſtribution of the Ideas neceſſary to Reaſon.*

Your Lordſhip here argues againſt a Propoſition that I know no Body that holds; I am ſure the Author of *The Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding* never thought, nor in that *Eſſay* hath any where ſaid, That the Ideas that come into the Mind by *Senſation and Reflection, are all the Ideas that are neceſſary to Reaſon*, or that Reaſon is exerciſed about; for then he muſt have laid by all the Ideas of ſimple and mix'd Modes and Relations, and the complex Ideas of the Species of Subſtances, about which he has ſpent ſo many Chapters; and muſt have denied that theſe complex Ideas are the Objects of Mens Thoughts or Reaſonings, which he is far enough from. All that he has ſaid about

Senſation and *Reflection* is, That all our *ſimple Ideas* are received by them, and that theſe ſimple Ideas are the Foundation of all our Knowledge, for as much as all our complex, relative and general Ideas are made by the Mind, abſtracting, enlarging, comparing, compounding and referring, *&c.* theſe ſimple Ideas, and their ſeveral Combinations, one to another, whereby complex and general Ideas are formed of Modes, Relations, and the ſeveral Species of Subſtances, all which are made uſe of by *Reaſon*, as well as the other Faculties of the Mind.

I therefore agree with your Lordſhip, That the Ideas of Senſation or Reflection *is a very inſufficient diſtribution of the Ideas neceſſary to Reaſon.* Only my Agreement with your Lordſhip had been more entire to the whole Sentence, if your Lordſhip had rather ſaid *Ideas* made uſe of by *Reaſon*, becauſe I do not well know what is meant by *Ideas neceſſary to Reaſon.* For Reaſon being a Faculty of the Mind, nothing, in my poor Opinion, can properly be

ſaid

ſaid to be *neceſſary* to that Faculty, but what is required to its being. As nothing is neceſſary to Sight in a Man, but ſuch a Conſtitution of the Body and Organ, that a Man may have the Power of Seeing; ſo I ſubmit it to your Lordſhip, whether any thing can properly be ſaid to be *neceſſary to Reaſon* in a Man, but ſuch a Conſtitution of Body or Mind, or both, as may give him the Power of Reaſoning. Indeed ſuch a particular ſort of Objects or Inſtruments may be ſometimes ſaid neceſſary to the Eye, but that is never ſaid in reference to the Faculty of Seeing, but in reference to ſome particular end of Seeing; and then a Microſcope and a Mite may be neceſſary to the Eye, if the End propoſed be to know the Shape and Parts of that Animal. And ſo if a Man would reaſon about *Subſtance*, then the Idea of *Subſtance* is neceſſary to his Reaſon: But yet I doubt not but that many a Rational Creature has been, who, in all his Life, never bethought himſelf of any neceſſity his Reaſon had of an Idea of Subſtance.

Your Lordſhips next Words are.

P. 233. *For beſides theſe, there muſt be ſome general Ideas, which the Mind doth form, not by meer comparing thoſe Ideas it has got from Senſe or Reflection; but by forming diſtinct, general Notions of things from particular Ideas.*

Here, again, I perfectly agree with your Lordſhip, That beſides the particular Ideas received from Senſation and Reflection, the Mind *forms general Ideas, not by meer comparing thoſe Ideas it has got by Senſation and Reflection*; for this I do not remember I ever ſaid. But this I ſay,

B. 3. c. 3. §. 6. " Ideas become general, by ſepara-
" rating from them the Circum-
" ſtances of Time and Place, and
" any other Ideas that may deter-
" mine them, to this or that parti-
" cular Exiſtence. By this way of
" Abſtraction, they are made, *&c.*

B. 1. c. 11. §. 9. And to the ſame purpoſe I explain my ſelf in another place.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *The Mind forms general Ideas, by forming general Notions of Things from particular Ideas.* And I ſay, " The Mind forms

" gene-

" general Ideas, by abſtracting from " particular ones. So that there is no difference that I perceive between us in this Matter, but only a little in Expreſſion.

It follows. *And among theſe general Notions, or rational Ideas, Subſtance is one of the firſt; becauſe we find that we can have no true Conceptions of any Modes or Accidents (no matter which) but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum, *or Subject wherein they are. Since it is a Repugnancy to our firſt Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and therefore the rational Idea of Subſtance, is one of the firſt and moſt natural Ideas in our Minds.* P. 235.

Whether the general Idea of Subſtance be *one of the firſt or moſt natural Ideas in our Minds*, I will not diſpute with your Lordſhip, as not being, I think, very material to the Matter in Hand. But as to the Idea of Subſtance, what it is, and how we come by it, your Lordſhip ſays, *It is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes and Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and therefore*

fore we muſt conceive a Subſtratum *wherein they are.*

B. 2. c. 23. §. 4. And I ſay, " Becauſe we cannot " conceive how ſimple Ideas of ſen- " ſible Qualities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, " or one in another, we ſuppoſe " them exiſting in and ſupported by " ſome common Subject. Which I, §. 1. with your Lordſhip, call alſo *Subſtratum.*

What now can be more conſonant to it ſelf, than what your Lordſhip and I have ſaid in theſe two Paſſages is conſonant one to another? Whereupon, my Lord, give me leave, I beſeech you, to boaſt to the World, That what I have ſaid concerning our general Idea of Subſtance, and the way how we come by it, has the Honour to be confirmed by your Lordſhips Authority. And that from hence I may be ſure the ſaying, That the general Idea we have of Subſtance is, that it is a *Subſtratum* or Support to Modes or Accidents, wherein they do ſubſiſt; and that the Mind forms it, becauſe it cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt of themſelves, has no Objection in it

it againſt the Trinity; for then your Lordſhip would not, I know, be of that Opinion, nor own it in a Chapter where you are anſwering Objections againſt the Trinity, however my Words, which amount to no more, have been (I know not how) brought into that Chapter: Tho' what they have to do there, I muſt confeſs to your Lordſhip, I do not yet ſee.

In the next Words your Lordſhip ſays. *But we are ſtill told, That our Underſtandings can have no other Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.* P. 236.

The Words of that Sect. your Lordſhip quotes, are theſe. "The B. 2. c. 1. "Underſtanding ſeems to me, not §. 5. "to have the leaſt glimmering "of any Ideas, which it doth not "receive from one of theſe two. "External Objects furniſh the Mind "with the Ideas of ſenſible Qualities, which are all thoſe different "Perceptions they produce in us: "And the Mind furniſhes the Underſtanding with Ideas of its "own

" own Operations. Theſe, when
" we have taken a full Survey of
" them, and their ſeveral Modes,
" and the Compoſitions made out of
" them, we ſhall find to contain all
" our whole Stock of Ideas; and
" that we have nothing in our
" Minds, which did not come in,
" one of thoſe two ways. Let any
" one examine his own Thoughts,
" and throughly ſearch into his Un-
" derſtanding, and then let him tell
" me, Whether all the original
" Ideas he has there, are any other
" than of the Objects of his Senſes,
" or of the Operations of his Mind,
" conſidered as Objects of his Re-
" flection: And how great a Maſs
" of Knowledge ſoever he imagins
" to be lodged there, he will, upon
" taking a ſtrict View, ſee, that
" he has not any Idea in his
" Mind, but what one of theſe two
" have imprinted, though, perhaps,
" with infinite variety compounded
" and inlarged by the Under-
" ſtanding, as we ſhall ſee here-
" after.

Theſe

Theſe Words ſeem to me to ſignifie ſomething different from what your Lordſhip has cited out of them; and if they do not, were intended, I am ſure, by me, to ſignifie all thoſe complex Ideas of Modes, Relations and Specifick Subſtances, which how the Mind it ſelf forms out of ſimple Ideas, I have ſhewed in the following part of my Book, and intended to refer to it by theſe Words, " As we ſhall ſee hereafter, with which I cloſe that Paragraph. But if by *Ideas* your Lordſhip ſignifies *ſimple Ideas*, in the Words you have ſet down, I grant then they contain my Senſe, *viz. That our Underſtandings can have (i. e.* in the natural exerciſe of our Faculties) *no other ſimple Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.*

Your Lordſhip goes on. *And* [*we are ſtill told*] *that herein chiefly lies the Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, That theſe cannot abſtract and inlarge Ideas, as Men do.*

Had

Had your Lordſhip done me the Favour to have quoted the place, in my Book, from whence you had taken theſe Words, I ſhould not have been at a loſs where to find them. Thoſe in my Book, which I can remember any where come neareſt to them, run thus.

B. 2. c. 11. §. 10. " This, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the Power of abſtracting is not at all in Brutes; and that the having of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to.

Tho', ſpeaking of the Faculties of the Humane Underſtanding, I took occaſion, by the bye, to conjecture how far Brutes partook with Men in any of the intellectual Faculties; yet it never entred into my Thoughts, on that occaſion, to compare the utmoſt Perfections of Humane Nature with that of Brutes, and therefore was far from ſaying, *Herein chiefly lies the Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, that theſe cannot abſtract and in-*

inlarge their Ideas, as Men do. For it ſeems to me an Abſurdity, I would not willingly be guilty of, to ſay, That the *Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly*, or any ways in this, *that Brutes cannot abſtract.* For *Brutes* being not able to do any thing, cannot be any *Excellency* of *Mankind.* The Ability of *Mankind* does not lie in the Impotency or Diſabilities of *Brutes.* If your Lordſhip had charged me to have ſaid, That *herein lies* one *Excellency of Mankind* above *Brutes, viz.* That Men can, and Brutes cannot abſtract; I muſt have owned it to be my Senſe: But what I ought to ſay to what your Lordſhip approved or diſapproved of in it, I ſhall better underſtand, when I know to what purpoſe your Lordſhip was pleaſed to cite it.

The immediately following Paragraph runs thus. *But how comes the general Idea of Subſtance, to be framed in our Minds? Is this by* "abſtracting "and inlarging ſimple Ideas? *No,* "But it is by a Complication of "many ſimple Ideas together: Be- "cauſe

P. 236.

B. 2. c. 23. §. 1.

" cauſe not imagining how theſe " ſimple Ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtome our ſelves to " ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum* wherein " they do ſubſiſt, and from whence " they do reſult, which therefore " we call Subſtance. *And is this all indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being of Subſtance,* " That we accuſtome " our ſelves to ſuppoſe a *Subſtratum? Is that Cuſtom grounded upon true Reaſon, or not? If not, then Accidents or Modes muſt ſubſiſt of themſelves, and theſe ſimple Ideas need no Tortoiſe to ſupport them: For Figures and Colours,* &c. *would do well enough of themſelves, but for ſome Fancies Men have accuſtomed themſelves to.*

Herein your Lordſhip ſeems to charge me with two Faults: One, That I make the *general Idea of Subſtance to be framed, not by abſtracting and enlarging ſimple Ideas, but by a Complication of many ſimple Ideas together:* The other, as if I had ſaid, The *being of Subſtance* had no other Foundation but the Fancies of Men.

As

As to the firſt of theſe, I beg leave to remind your Lordſhip, That I ſay in more Places than one, and particularly thoſe above quoted, where *ex profeſſo* I treat of Abſtraction and general Ideas, That they are all made by abſtracting, and therefore could not be underſtood to mean, that that of *Subſtance* was made any other way, however my Pen might have ſlipt, or the negligence of Expreſſion, where I might have ſomething elſe than the general Idea of Subſtance in view, might make me ſeem to ſay ſo.

That I was not ſpeaking of the *general Idea of Subſtance* in the Paſſage your Lordſhip quotes, is manifeſt from the Title of that Chapter, which is, *Of the Complex Ideas of Subſtances.* And the firſt Sect. of it, which your Lordſhip cites for thoſe Words you have ſet down, ſtands thus.

" The Mind being, as I have de- L. 2. c. 23.
" clared, furniſhed with a great §. 1.
" number of the ſimple Ideas, con-
" veyed in by the Senſes, as they are
" found in exterior Things, or by

" Reflections on its own Operations,
" takes notice alſo, that a certain
" number of theſe ſimple Ideas go
" conſtantly together, which being
" preſumed to belong to one thing,
" and Words being ſuited to com-
" mon Apprehenſion, and made uſe
" of for quick Diſpatch, are called,
" ſo united in one Subject, by one
" Name; which, by Inadvertency,
" we are apt afterward to talk of,
" and conſider as one ſimple Idea,
" which indeed is a Complication of
" many Ideas together: Becauſe, as
" I have ſaid, not imagining how
" theſe ſimple Ideas can ſubſiſt by
" themſelves, we accuſtome our
" ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*,
" wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from
" which they do reſult, which there-
" fore we call *Subſtance*.

In which Words, I do not obſerve any that deny the *general Idea of Subſtance* to be made by Abſtraction; nor any that ſay, it is made *by a Complication of many ſimple Ideas together*. But ſpeaking in that place, of the Ideas of diſtinct Subſtances, ſuch as Man, Horſe, Gold, *&c.* I ſay they

are

are made up of certain Combinations of ſimple Ideas, which Combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one ſimple Idea, tho' they are many; and we call it by one Name of *Subſtance*, though made up of Modes, from the cuſtom of ſuppoſing a *Subſtratum*, wherein that Combination does ſubſiſt. So that in this Paragraph I only give an account of the Idea of diſtinct Subſtances, ſuch as *Oak*, *Elephant*, *Iron*, &c. how tho' they are made up of diſtinct Complications of Modes, yet they are looked on as one Idea, called by one Name, as making diſtinct ſorts of Subſtances.

But that my Notion of *Subſtance in general* is quite different from theſe, and has no ſuch Combination of ſimple *Ideas* in it, is evident from the immediate following Words; where I ſay. " The Idea of *pure Subſtance* B. 2. c. 23.
" *in general*, is only a Suppoſition of §. 2.
" we know not what Support of ſuch
" Qualities as are capable of pro-
" ducing ſimple Ideas in us. And theſe two I plainly diſtinguiſh all along, particularly where I ſay,

§. 6. " Whatever therefore, be the ſecret " and *abſtract* Nature of Subſtance " in general, all the Ideas we have " of particular, diſtinct Subſtances, " are nothing but ſeveral Combina- " tions of ſimple Ideas, co-exiſting " in ſuch, tho' unknown, cauſe of " their Union, as makes the whole " ſubſiſt of it ſelf.

The other thing laid to my Charge, is, as if I took the *being of Subſtance* to be doubtful, or render'd it ſo by the imperfect and ill-grounded Idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to ſay, That I ground not the *being* but the *Idea* of Subſtance, on our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*; for 'tis of the *Idea* alone I ſpeak there, and not of the *being of Subſtance*. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, That a *Man* is a Subſtance, I cannot be ſuppoſed to queſtion or doubt of the *being of Subſtance*, till I can queſtion or doubt of my own *being*. Further I ſay, " Senſation convinces
Ib. §. 29. " us that there are ſolid, extended

" Sub-

" Subſtances ; and Reflection, that " there are thinking ones. So that I think the *being of Subſtance* is not ſhaken by what I have ſaid: And if the Idea of it ſhould be, yet (the *being* of things depending not on our *Ideas*) the *being of Subſtance* would not be at all ſhaken by my ſaying, We had but an obſcure, imperfect *Idea* of it, and that that Idea came from our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum* ; or indeed if I ſhould ſay, We had no *Idea* of Subſtance at all. For a great many things may be and are granted to have a *being*, and be in nature of which we have no Ideas. For Example; It cannot be doubted but there are diſtinct Species of ſeparate Spirits, of which yet we have no diſtinct Ideas at all: It cannot be queſtioned but Spirits have ways of Communicating their Thoughts, and yet we have no Idea of it at all.

The *being* then of *Subſtance* being ſafe and ſecure, notwithſtanding any thing I have ſaid, let us ſee whether the

Idea of it be not ſo too. Your Lord-
P. 236. ſhip asks, with concern, *And is this all indeed that is to be ſaid for the being* (if your Lordſhip pleaſe let it be the Idea) *of Subſtance*, that we accuſtome our ſelves to ſuppoſe a *Subſtratum*? *Is that Cuſtome grounded upon true Reaſon, or no?* I have ſaid, that it
B. 2. c. 23. §. 4. is grounded upon this, That " we " cannot *conceive* how ſimple Ideas " of ſenſible Qualities ſhould ſubſiſt " alone, and therefore we ſuppoſe " them to exiſt in, and to be ſup- " ported by ſome common Subject, " which Support we denote by the " name *Subſtance*." Which I think is a *true Reaſon*, becauſe it is the ſame your Lordſhip grounds the Suppoſition of a *Subſtratum* on, in this very Page; even on the *repugnancy to our Conceptions, that Modes and Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves*. So that I have the good Luck here again to agree with Your Lordſhip: And conſequently conclude, I have your Approbation in this, That the *Subſtratum* to Modes or Accidents, which is our Idea of Subſtance in general, is founded in this, That " we can-

" not

" not *conceive* how Modes or " Accidents can ſubſiſt by them- " ſelves.

The Words next following are, *If it be grounded upon plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an Idea of Subſtance, which comes not in by Senſation or Reflection; and ſo we may be certain of ſomething which we have not, by thoſe Ideas.* L. B. W. P. 237.

Theſe Words of your Lordſhips contain nothing, that I ſee in them, againſt me; for I never ſaid, That the *general Idea of Subſtance comes in by* Senſation *and* Reflection: Or, That it is a ſimple Idea of Senſation or Reflection, tho' it be ultimately founded in them; for it is a complex Idea, made up of the general *Idea* of *ſomething*, or *being*, with the Relation of a Support to Accidents. For general Ideas come not into the Mind by Senſation or Reflection, but are the Creatures or Inventions of the Underſtanding, as, I think, I have ſhewn; and alſo, how the Mind makes them from Ideas, which

it has got by Senſation and Reflection: And as to the Ideas of Relation, how the Mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, I have likewiſe ſhewn.

B. 3. c. 3.

B. 2. c. 25. & c. 28. §. 18.

But that I may not be miſtaken what I mean, when I ſpeak of Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, as the Materials of all our Knowledge; give me leave, my Lord, to ſet down here a place or two, out of my Book, to explain my ſelf; as, I thus ſpeak of Ideas of *Senſation* and Reflection.

B. 2. c. 1. §. 5. "That theſe, when we have taken "a full Survey of them, and their "ſeveral Modes, and the Compoſi- "tions made out of them, we ſhall "find to contain all our whole "Stock of Ideas; and we have no- "thing in our Minds, which did not "come in one of theſe two ways. This Thought, in another place, I expreſs thus:

"Theſe

" Theſe ſimple Ideas, the Mate- B. 2. c. 2.
" rials of all our Knowledge, are §. 2.
" ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the
" Mind, only by thoſe two ways
" above-mentioned, *viz.* Senſation
" and Reflection. And again,

" Theſe are the moſt conſiderable B. 2. c. 7.
" of thoſe ſimple Ideas which the §. 10.
" Mind has, and out of which is
" made all its other Knowledge;
" all which it receives by the two
" fore-mentioned ways, of Senſation
" and Reflection. And,

" Thus I have, in a ſhort Draught, B. 2. c. 21.
" given a View of our original Ideas, §. 73.
" from whence all the reſt are de-
" rived, and of which they are made
" up.

This, and the like ſaid in other places, is what I have thought concerning Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, as the Foundation and Materials of all our Ideas, and conſequently of all our Knowledge. I have ſet down theſe Particulars out of my Book, that the Reader, having

ing a full view of my Opinion herein, may the better ſee what in it is liable to your Lordſhips Reprehenſion. For that your Lordſhip is not very well ſatisfied with it, appears not only by the Words under Conſideration, but by theſe alſo. *But*
P. 236. *we are ſtill told, That our Underſtanding can have no other Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.* And,
P. 240. *Let us ſuppoſe this Principle to be true; That the ſimple Ideas, by Senſation or Reflection, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning.*

Your Lordſhips Argument, in the Paſſage we are upon, ſtands thus. *If the general Idea of Subſtance be grounded upon plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an Idea of Subſtance, which comes not in by* Senſation *or* Reflection. This is a Conſequence which, with Submiſſion, I think will not hold, becauſe it is founded upon a Suppoſition which, I think, will not hold, *viz.* That *Reaſon* and *Ideas* are inconſiſtent; for if that Suppoſition be not true, then

then the *general Idea* of Subſtance may be *grounded on plain and evident Reaſon*; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from Ideas *which come in by Senſation or Reflection*, and ſo cannot be ſaid to come in by *Senſation* or *Reflection*.

To explain my ſelf, and clear my meaning in this Matter. All the Ideas of all the ſenſible Qualities of a Chery, come into my Mind by Senſation; the Ideas of *Perceiving*, *Thinking*, *Reaſoning*, *Knowing*, &c. come into my Mind by *Reflection*: The Ideas of theſe Qualities and Actions, or Powers, are perceived by the Mind, to be by themſelves inconſiſtent with Exiſtence; or, as your Lordſhip well expreſſes it, *We find that we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum *or Subject*, *wherein they are*; *i. e.* That they cannot exiſt or ſubſiſt of themſelves. Hence the Mind perceives their neceſſary Connection with Inherence or being Supported, which being a P. 236.

re-

relative Idea, ſuperadded to the *red Colour* in a Chery, or to *Thinking* in a Man, the Mind frames the correlative Idea of a *Support*. For I never denied, That the Mind could frame to it ſelf Ideas of Relation, but have ſhewed the quite contrary in my Chapters about *Relation*. But becauſe a Relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the Relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a *Supporter* or a *Support*, is not repreſented to the Mind by any clear and diſtinct Idea; therefore the obſcure, indiſtinct, vague Idea of *thing* or *ſomething*, is all that is left to be the poſitive Idea, which has the relation of a *Support* or *Subſtratum* to Modes or Accidents; and that general, indetermined Idea of *ſomething*, is, by the abſtraction of the Mind, derived alſo from the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection: And thus the Mind, from the poſitive, ſimple Ideas got by Senſation or Reflection, comes to the general, relative Idea of *Subſtance*; which without theſe poſitive, ſimple Ideas, it would never have.

This

This your Lordſhip (without giving by Retail all the particular Steps of the Mind in this Buſineſs) has well expreſſed in this more familiar way.

We find we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we muſt conceive a Subſtratum *or Subject wherein they are; ſince it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.* P. 236.

Hence your Lordſhip calls it the *rational Idea of Subſtances.* And ſays, *I grant that by Senſation and Reflection, we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.* So that if this be that which your Lordſhip means *by the rational Idea of Subſtance*, I ſee nothing there is in it againſt what I have ſaid, that it is founded on ſimple Ideas of Senſation or Reflection, and that it is a very obſcure Idea. Ibid. P. 253.

Your

P. 273. Your Lordſhips Concluſion from your foregoing Words, is, *And ſo we may be certain of ſome things which we have not by thoſe Ideas*; Which is a Propoſition, whoſe preciſe meaning your Lordſhip will forgive me if I profeſs, as it ſtands there, I do not underſtand. For it is uncertain to me whether your Lordſhip means, We may certainly know the Exiſtence of ſomething which we have not by thoſe Ideas; or certainly know the diſtinct Properties of ſomething which we have *not by thoſe Ideas*; or certainly know the Truth of ſome Propoſition *which we have not by thoſe Ideas*; for to be *certain of ſomething* may ſignifie either of theſe: But in which ſoever of theſe it be meant, I do not ſee how I am concerned in it.

Your Lordſhips next Paragraph is as followeth.

P. 273. "The Idea of Subſtance, *we are* "*told again*, is nothing but the ſup- "poſed, but unknown Support of

"Theſe

" thoſe Qualities we find exiſting, " which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt, " *ſine re ſubſtante*; which, accord- " ing to the true import of the Word, " is in plain Engliſh, ſtanding under " or upholding. *But very little Weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology, when the Word is uſed in another Senſe by the beſt Authors, ſuch as* Cicero *and* Quintillian; *who take Subſtance for the ſame as Eſſence, as* Valla *hath proved; and ſo the Greek Word imports: But* Boethius *in tranſlating* Ariſtotle's *Predicaments, rather choſe the word* Subſtance *as more proper, to expreſs* a *Compound Being, and Reſerved* Eſſence, *for what was more ſimple and immaterial. And in this Senſe,* Subſtance *was not applied to God but only* Eſſence, *as* St. Auguſtine *obſerves.*

Your Lordſhip here ſeems to diſlike my taking notice, That the Derivation of the Word *Subſtance* favours the Idea we have of it: And your Lordſhip tells me, *That very little Weight is to be laid on a bare* Grammatical *Etymology.* Though little

little Weight were to be laid on it, if there were nothing elſe to be ſaid for it; yet, when it is brought to confirm an Idea which your Lordſhip allows of, nay, calls a *Rational Idea*, and ſays is founded in *evident Reaſon*, I do not ſee what your Lordſhip had to blame in it. For though *Cicero* and *Quintillian* take *Subſtantia* for the ſame with *Eſſence*, as your Lordſhip ſays; or for Riches and Eſtate, as I think they alſo do; yet I ſuppoſe it will ſtill be true, That *Subſtantia* is derived *a Subſtando*, and that that ſhews the original Import of the Word. For, my Lord, I have been long of Opinion, as may be ſeen in my Book, That if we knew the Original of all the Words we meet with, we ſhould thereby be very much help'd to know the Ideas they were firſt applied to and made ſtand for; and therefore I muſt beg your Lordſhip to excuſe to this Conceit of mine, this *Etymological* Obſervation eſpecially, ſince it hath nothing in it againſt the Truth, nor againſt your Lordſhips Idea of *Subſtance*.

But

But your Lordſhip oppoſes to this Etymology the uſe of the word *Subſtance, by the beſt Authors in another Senſe*; and thereupon give the World a Learned Account of the uſe of the word *Subſtance*, in a Senſe wherein it is not taken for the *Subſtratum* of Accidents: However, I think it a ſufficient Juſtification of my ſelf to your Lordſhip, that I uſe it in the ſame Senſe your Lordſhip does, and that your Lordſhip thinks not fit to govern your ſelf by thoſe Authorities; for then your Lordſhip could not apply the word *Subſtance to God*, as *Boethius* did not, and as your Lordſhip has prov'd out of St. *Auguſtine*, that it was not applied. Tho' I gueſs 'tis the Conſideration of *Subſtance*, as it is applied to God, that brings it into your Lordſhips preſent Diſcourſe. But if your Lordſhip and I (if without Preſumption I may join my ſelf with you) have in the uſe of the word *Subſtance* quitted the Example of the *beſt Authors*, I think the Authority of the Schools, which has a long time

been allowed in Philoſophical Terms, will bear us out in this Matter.

P. 238. In the remaining part of this Paragraph it follows. *But afterwards the Names of* Subſtance *and* Eſſence *were promiſcuouſly uſed, with reſpect to God and his Creatures; and do imply, that which makes the real Being, as diſtinguiſhed from Modes and Properties. And ſo the* Subſtance *and* Eſſence *of a Man are the ſame; not being taken for the individual* Subſtance, *which cannot be underſtood without particular Modes and Properties; but the general* Subſtance *or* Nature *of Man abſtractly, from all the Circumſtances of Perſons.*

Here your Lordſhip makes theſe Terms *general Subſtance*, *Nature* and *Eſſence*, to ſignifie the ſame thing: How properly I ſhall not here enquire. Your Lordſhip goes on.

P. 238. *And I deſire to know, whether according to true Reaſon, that be not a clear Idea of Man; not of* Peter, James

James *or* John, *but of a Man as ſuch.*

This, I think, no Body denies: Nor can any one deny it, who will not ſay, That the general abſtract Idea which he has in his Mind of a Sort or Species of Animals that he calls Man, ought not to have that general name *Man* applied to it: For that is all (as I humbly conceive) which theſe Words of your Lordſhip here amount to.

This, your Lordſhip ſays, *is not a meer univerſal Name, or Mark, or Sign.* Your Lordſhip ſays it is an *Idea*, and every Body muſt grant it to be an *Idea*; and therefore it is, in my Opinion, ſafe enough from being thought a *meer Name, or Mark, or Sign of that Idea.* For he muſt think very odly, who takes the *general Name* of any *Idea*, to be the *general Idea* it ſelf: It is a *meer Mark or Sign* of it without doubt, and nothing elſe. Your Lordſhip adds. P. 238.

P. 238. *But there is as clear and distinct a Conception of this in our Minds, as we can have from any such simple Ideas as are conveyed by our Senses.*

If your Lordship means by this, (as the Words seem to me to import) That we have as clear and distinct an Idea of the *general Substance*, or *Nature*, or *Essence*, of the species *Man*, as we have of the particular Colour and Figure of a Man when we look on him, or of his Voice when we hear him Speak, I must crave leave to dissent from your Lordship. Because the Idea we have of the Substance, wherein the Properties of a Man do inhere, is a very obscure Idea: So that in that part, our general Idea of *Man* is obscure and confused: As also, how that Substance is differently modified in the different Species of Creatures, so as to have different Properties and Powers whereby they are distinguished, that also we have very obscure, or rather no distinct

ſtinct Ideas of at all. But there is no Obſcurity or Confuſion at all in the Idea of a Figure that I clearly ſee, or of a Sound that I diſtinctly hear; and ſuch are, or may be, the Ideas that are conveyed in by Senſation or Reflection. It follows.

I do not deny that the diſtinction *of particular Subſtances, is by the ſeveral Modes and Properties of them, (which they may call a Complication of ſimple Ideas if they pleaſe)*; *but I do aſſert, That the general Idea which relates to the Eſſence, without theſe, is ſo juſt and true an Idea, that without it the Complication of ſimple Ideas, will never give us a right Notion of it.* P. 238.

Here, I think, that your Lordſhip *aſſerts*, That the *general Idea of the real Eſſence* (for ſo I underſtand general *Idea which relates to the Eſſence) without the Modes and Properties, is a juſt and true Idea.* For Example: The real Eſſence of a Thing, is that internal Conſtitution on which the Properties of that

Thing depend: Now your Lordſhip ſeems to me to acknowledge, That that internal Conſtitution or Eſſence we cannot know; for your
P. 256. Lordſhip ſays, *That from the Powers and Properties of Things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Eſſence of Things, as theſe Powers and Properties diſcover.* That is unqueſtionably ſo; but if thoſe Powers and Properties diſcover no more of thoſe *internal Eſſences*, but that there are *internal Eſſences*, we ſhall know only that there are *internal Eſſences*, but ſhall have no Idea or Conception at all of what they are; as your Lordſhip ſeems to confeſs in the next Words of the ſame 256 pag. where you add. *I do not ſay, That we can know all Eſſences of Things alike, nor that we can attain to a perfect Underſtanding of all that belong to them; but if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties, what is it we complain of the want of?* Wherein your Lordſhip ſeems to terminate our Knowledge of thoſe in-

internal Eſſences in this, *That there are certain* Beings *indued with diſtinct Powers and Properties.* But what theſe *Beings*, theſe *internal Eſſences* are, that we have no diſtinct Conceptions of; as your Lordſhip confeſſes yet plainer a little after, in theſe Words: *For although we cannot comprehend the internal Frame and Conſtitution of Things.* So that we having, as is confeſſed, no Idea of what this *Eſſence*, this *internal Conſtitution* of Things on which their Properties depend, is, How can we ſay it is any way *a juſt and true Idea?* But your Lordſhip ſays, *It is ſo juſt and true an Idea, that without it the Contemplation of ſimple Ideas will never give us a right Notion of it.* All the Idea we have of it, which is only that there is an internal, tho' unknown Conſtitution of Things on which their Property depends, ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, and the Contemplation of them have alone help'd us to; and becauſe they can help us no further, that is the Reaſon we have no perfecter Notions of it. P. 257.

That which your Lordſhip ſeems to me, principally to drive at, in this and the foregoing Paragraph, is, to aſſert, That the *general Subſtance of Man*, and ſo of any other Species, is that which makes the real Being of that Species, abſtractly from the Individuals of that Species. By *general Subſtance* here, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip means the general Idea of Subſtance: And that which induces me to take the liberty to ſuppoſe ſo, is, that I think your Lordſhip is here diſcourſing of the Idea of Subſtance, and how we come by it. And if your Lordſhip ſhould mean otherwiſe, I muſt take the liberty to deny there is any ſuch thing in *rerum Natura*, as a *general Subſtance* that exiſts it ſelf, or makes any thing.

Taking it then for granted that your Lordſhip ſays, That this is the general Idea of Subſtance, *viz.* That it is *that which makes the real Being of any thing*. Your Lordſhip ſays, *That it is as clear and diſtinct a*

Con-

Conception in our Minds, as we can have from any ſuch ſimple Ideas as are conveyed by our Senſes. Here I muſt crave leave to diſſent from your Lordſhip. Your Lordſhip ſays, in the former part of this Page, *That Subſtance and Eſſence do imply that which makes the real Being.* Now what I beſeech your Lordſhip do theſe Words *That which*, here ſignifie more than *ſomething?* And the Idea expreſſed by *ſomething*, I am apt to think your Lordſhip will not ſay *is as clear and diſtinct a Conception* or Idea in the Mind, as the Idea of the red Colour of a Chery, or the bitter Taſte of Wormwood, or the Figure of a Circle, brought into the Mind by the Senſes.

Your Lordſhip farther ſays, *It makes*; whereby I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means *conſtitutes* or is the *real Being, as diſtinguiſhed from Modes and Properties.*

For Example, my Lord, ſtrip this ſuppoſed general Idea of a *Man* or *Gold*, of all its Modes and Properties,

and

and then tell me whether your Lordſhip has as clear and diſtinct an Idea of what remains, as you have of the Figure of the one, or the yellow Colour of the other. I muſt confeſs the remaining *ſomething* to me affords ſo vague, confuſed and obſcure an Idea, that I cannot ſay I have any diſtinct Conception of it; for barely by being *ſomething*, it is not in my Mind clearly diſtinguiſhed from the Figure or Voice of a Man, or the Colour or Taſte of a Chery, for they are *ſomething* too. If your Lordſhip has a clear and diſtinct Idea of that *ſomething*, *which makes the real Being as diſtinguiſhed from all its Modes and Properties*, your Lordſhip muſt enjoy the Priviledge of the Sight, and clear Ideas you have: Nor can you be denied them, becauſe I have not the like; the dimneſs of my Conceptions, muſt not pretend to hinder the clearneſs of your Lordſhips, any more than the want of them in a blind Man, can debar your Lordſhip of the clear and diſtinct Ideas of Colours: The obſcurity I find in my own Mind, when

when I examine what poſitive, general, ſimple Idea of Subſtance I have, is ſuch as I profeſs, and further than that I cannot go: But what and how clear it is in the Underſtanding of a Seraphim, or of an elevated Mind, that I cannot determine. Your Lordſhip goes on.

I muſt do that Right to the Ingenious Author of The Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding *(from whence theſe Notions are borrowed to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them) that he makes the Caſe of* Spiritual, *and* Corporeal Subſtances *to be alike, as to their Ideas. And* " That we have " as clear a Notion of a Spirit, as " we have of a Body; the one be- " ing ſuppoſed to be the *Subſtratum* " to thoſe ſimple Ideas we have from " without, and the other of thoſe " Operations we find within our " ſelves. And that it is as rational to " affirm, There is no Body, be- " cauſe we cannot know its Eſſence, " as 'tis called, or have no Idea of " the Subſtance of Matter; as to " ſay P. 239.

" ſay there is no Spirit, becauſe we " know not its Eſſence, or have no " Idea of a ſpiritual Subſtance.

From hence it follows, That we may be certain that there are both Spiritual and Bodily Subſtances, *although we can have* no clear and diſtinct Ideas of them. *But if our Reaſon depend upon our* clear and diſtinct Ideas, *how is this poſſible? We cannot Reaſon without* clear Ideas, *and yet we may be certain without them: Can we be certain without Reaſon? Or, doth our Reaſon give us true Notions of Things, without theſe Ideas? If it be ſo, this new Hypotheſis about Reaſon muſt appear to be very unreaſonable.*

That which your Lordſhip ſeems to argue here, is, That we may *be certain without clear and diſtinct Ideas.* Who your Lordſhip here argues againſt, under the Title of this *new Hypotheſis about Reaſon*, I confeſs I do not know. For I do not remember that I have any where placed *Certainty* only *in clear and diſtinct Ideas*, but in the clear and viſible Connection

ction of any of our Ideas, be thoſe Ideas what they will; as will appear to any one who will look into *B.* 4. *c.* 4. §. 18. & *B.* 4. *c.* 6. §. 3. of my Eſſay, in the latter of which he will find theſe Words. " Certainty of " Knowledge is to perceive the " agreement or diſagreement of " Ideas, as expreſſed in any Pro- " poſition. As in the Propoſition your Lordſhip mentions, *v. g. That we may be certain there are Spiritual and Bodily Subſtances*; or, That Bodily Subſtances do exiſt, is a Propoſition of whoſe Truth we may be certain; and ſo of Spiritual Subſtances. Let us now examine wherein the certainty of theſe Propoſitions conſiſts.

Firſt, As to the Exiſtence of Bodily Subſtances, I know by my Senſes that ſomething extended, and ſolid, and figur'd does exiſt; for my Senſes are the utmoſt Evidence and Certainty I have of the Exiſtence of extended, ſolid, figured Things. Theſe Modes being then known to exiſt by our Senſes, the Exiſtence of them

them (which I cannot conceive can ſubſiſt without ſomething to ſupport them) makes me ſee the Connection of thoſe Ideas with a Support, or, as it is called, a Subject of Inheſion, and ſo conſequently the Connection of that Support (which cannot be nothing) with Exiſtence. And thus I come by a certainty of the Exiſtence of that *ſomething* which is a Support of thoſe ſenſible Modes, though I have but a very confus'd, looſe and undetermined Idea of it, ſignified by the name *Subſtance*. After the ſame manner experimenting thinking in my ſelf, by the Exiſtence of *Thought* in me, to which *ſomething* that thinks is evidently and neceſſarily connected in my Mind, I come to be certain that there exiſts in me *ſomething* that thinks, though of that *ſomething* which I call *Subſtance* alſo, I have but a very obſcure, imperfect Idea.

Before I go any further, it is fit I return my Acknowledgments to your Lordſhip, for the good Opinion you are pleaſed here to expreſs of

of the Author of *The Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, and that you do not impute to him the ill Uſe ſome may have made of his Notions. But he craves leave to ſay, That he ſhould have been better preſerv'd from the hard and ſiniſter Thoughts, which ſome Men are always ready for, if in what you have here publiſhed, your Lordſhip had been pleaſed to have ſhewn where you directed your Diſcourſe againſt him, and where againſt others, from *p.* 234. to *p.* 262. Nothing but my Book and my Words being quoted, the World will be apt to think that I am the Perſon who argue againſt the Trinity, and deny Myſteries, againſt whom your Lordſhip directs thoſe Pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over with great Attention, yet, in many Places, I cannot diſcern whether it be againſt me or any Body elſe, that your Lordſhip is arguing. That which often makes the Difficulty, is, That I do not ſee how what I ſay, does at all concern the Controverſie your Lordſhip is engaged in, and yet I alone

alone am quoted. Your Lordſhip goes on.

P. 240. *Let us ſuppoſe this Principle to be true,* That the ſimple Ideas by Senſation or Reflection, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning: *I ask then how we come to be certain, that there are* Spiritual Subſtances *in the World, ſince we can have no* clear and diſtinct Ideas *concerning them? Can we be certain, without any* Foundation of Reaſon? *This is a new ſort of Certainty, for which we do not envy theſe Pretenders to* Reaſon. *But methinks, they ſhould not at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledg without them. If there be any other Method, they overthrow their own Principle; if there be none, how come they to any certainty that there are both* Bodily *and* Spiritual Subſtances?

This Paragraph, which continues to prove that we may have Certainty without *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, I would flatter my ſelf is not meant againſt

againſt me, becauſe it oppoſes nothing that I have ſaid, and ſo ſhall not ſay any thing to it, but only ſet it down to do your Lordſhip right, that the Reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how he will eaſily over-look me, and think I am not at all concerned in it, ſince my Words alone are quoted in ſeveral Pages immediately preceding and following: And in the very next Paragraph it is ſaid, *How THEY come to know*; which word *They* muſt ſignifie ſome Body beſides the Author *Of Chriſtianity not Myſterious*; and then I think, by the whole Tenor of your Lordſhips Diſcourſe, no Body will be left but me poſſible to be taken to be the other; for in the ſame Paragraph your Lordſhip ſays, *The ſame PERSONS ſay, That notwithſtanding THEIR Ideas, it is poſſible for Matter to think.*

I know not what other *Perſon ſays* ſo but I; but if any one does, I am ſure no *Perſon* but I *ſay* ſo in

my Book, which your Lordſhip has quoted for them, *viz. Humane Underſtanding*, B. 4. c. 3. This, which is a Riddle to me, the more amazes me, becauſe I find it in a Treatiſe of your Lordſhips, who ſo perfectly underſtand the Rules and Methods of Writing, whether in Controverſie or any other way. But this which ſeems wholly new to me, I ſhall better underſtand when your Lordſhip pleaſes to explain it. In the mean time I mention it as an Apology for my ſelf, if ſome times I miſtake your Lordſhips Aim, and ſo miſapply my Anſwer. What follows in your Lordſhips next Paragraph is this.

P. 240. *As to theſe latter (which is my Buſineſs) I muſt enquire farther, how THEY come to know there are ſuch? The Anſwer is* by Self-Reflection, on thoſe Powers we find in our ſelves, which cannot come from a meer bodily Subſtance. *I allow the Reaſon to be very good; but the Queſtion*

ſtion I ask, is, Whether this Argument be from the clear and diſtinct Idea *or not?* We have Ideas in our ſelves of the ſeveral Operations of our Minds, of Knowing, Willing, Conſidering, *&c.* which cannot come from a bodily Subſtance. *Very true; but is all this contained in the* ſimple Idea *of theſe* Operations? *How can that be, when the ſame* PERSONS *ſay, That notwithſtanding their Ideas, it is poſſible for* Matter to think? *For it is ſaid,*

" That we have the Ideas of Mat- Humane
" ter and Thinking, but poſſibly Underſt.
" ſhall never be able to know whe- l. 4. c. 3.
" ther any material Being thinks
" or not; it being impoſſible for §. 6. 2d Ed.
" us, by the Contemplation of our P. 310.
" own Ideas, without Revelation,
" to diſcover whether Omnipo-
" tency hath not given to ſome
" Syſtems of Matter, fitly diſpo-
" ſed, a Power to perceive or think.

If this be true, then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter *and* Thinking, *Matter may have a Power of Thinking: And if this hold, then*

it is impoſſible to prove a ſpiritual Subſtance in us, from the Idea of Thinking: *For how can we be aſſured by our Ideas, that God hath not given ſuch a Power of Thinking, to Matter ſo diſpoſed as our Bodies are? Eſpecially ſince it is ſaid,* " That in " reſpect of our Notions, it is " not much more remote from our " Comprehenſion to conceive that " God can, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add " to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of " Thinking, than that he ſhould " ſuper-add to it another Sub- " ſtance, with a Faculty of Think- " ing. *Whoever aſſerts this, can never prove a ſpiritual Subſtance in us from a Faculty of Thinking; becauſe he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter ſo diſpoſed cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the Matter of our Bodies ſo as to be capable of it.*

Theſe Words, my Lord, I am forced to take to my ſelf; for though your Lordſhip has put it

The

The ſame Perſons ſay, in the Plural Number, yet there is no Body quoted for the following Words but my *Eſſay*; nor do I think any Body but I has ſaid ſo. But ſo it is in this preſent Chapter, I have the good Luck to be joined with others for what I do not ſay, and others with me for what I imagine they do not ſay; which, how it came about, your Lordſhip can beſt reſolve. But to the Words themſelves: In them your Lordſhip argues, That upon my Principles *it cannot be proved that there is a ſpiritual Subſtance in us*. To which give me leave, with Submiſſion, to ſay, That I think it may be prov'd from my Principles, and I think I have done it; and the Proof in my Book ſtands thus. Firſt, we experiment in our ſelves *Thinking*. The Idea of this Action or Mode of *Thinking*, is inconſiſtent with the Idea of Self-Subſiſtence, and therefore has a neceſſary Connection, with a Support or Subject of Inheſion: The Idea of that Sup-

port is what we call *Subſtance*; and ſo from *Thinking* experimented in us, we have a proof of a *thinking Subſtance* in us, which in my Senſe is a *Spirit*. Againſt this your Lordſhip will argue, That by what I have ſaid of the poſſibility that God may, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it can never be proved that there is a ſpiritual Subſtance in us, becauſe upon that Suppoſition it is poſſible it may be a material Subſtance that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, That the general Idea of Subſtance being the ſame every where, the Modification of *Thinking*, or the Power of *Thinking* joined to it, makes it a *Spirit*, without conſidering what other Modifications it has, as, whether it has the Modification of *Solidity* or no. As on the other ſide *Subſtance*, that has the Modification of *Solidity* is Matter, whether it has the Modification of *Thinking* or no. And therefore, if your Lordſhip means by a *Spiri-*

tual,

tual, an immaterial Subſtance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my Principles can it be proved, your Lordſhip meaning (as I think you do) demonſtratively *proved*, That there is an immaterial Subſtance in us that thinks. Though I preſume, from what I have ſaid about the Suppoſition of a Syſtem of Matter, Thinking (which there demonſtrates that God is immaterial) will *prove* it in the higheſt degree probable, that the thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial. But your Lordſhip thinks not Probability enough, and by charging the want of Demonſtration upon my Principles, that the thinking Thing in us is immaterial, your Lordſhip ſeems to conclude it demonſtrable from Principles of Philoſophy. That Demonſtration I ſhould with Joy receive from your Lordſhip, or any one. For though all the great ends of Morality and Religion are well enough ſecured without it, as I have ſhewn, yet it would be a great ad-

B. 4. c. 10. §. 16.

B. 4. c. 3. §. 6.

vantage of our Knowledge in Nature and Philoſophy.

To what I have ſaid in my Book, to ſhew that all the great Ends of Religion and Morality are ſecured barely by the Immortality of the Soul, without a neceſſary Suppoſition that the Soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, That Immortality may and ſhall be annexed to that, which in its own Nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the Apoſtle expreſly declares in
1 Cor. 15. 53. theſe Words, *For this Corruptible muſt put on Incorruption, and this Mortal muſt put on Immortality.*

Perhaps my uſing the word *Spirit* for a thinking Subſtance, without excluding materiality out of it, will be thought too great a liberty, and ſuch as deſerves Cenſure, becauſe I leave immateriality out of the Idea I make it a Sign of. I readily own, that Words ſhould be ſparingly ventured on in a Senſe wholly new; and nothing but abſolute

ſolute neceſſity can excuſe the boldneſs of uſing any Term, in a Senſe whereof we can produce no Example. But in the preſent Caſe, I think I have great Authorities to juſtifie me. The Soul is agreed, on all Hands, to be that in us which thinks. And he that will look into the firſt Book of *Cicero*'s *Tuſculan* Queſtions, and into the 6th Book of *Virgills Æneads*, will find that theſe two great Men, who of all the *Romans* beſt underſtood Philoſophy, thought, or at leaſt did not deny the Soul to be a ſubtil Matter, which might come under the Name of *Aura*, or *Ignis*, or *Æther*, and this Soul they both of them called *Spiritus*; in the Notion of which 'tis plain they included only Thought and active Motion, without the total excluſion of Matter. Whether they thought right in this I do not ſay, that is not the Queſtion; but whether they ſpoke properly, when they called an active, thinking, ſubtil Subſtance, out of which they excluded only groſs

groſs and palpable Matter, *Spiritus Spirit.* I think that no Body will deny, That if any among the *Romans* can be allowed to ſpeak properly, *Tully* and *Virgil* are the two who may moſt ſecurely be depended on for it: And one of them, ſpeaking of the Soul, ſays, *Dum Spiritus hos regit artus:* And the other, *Vita continetur Corpore & Spiritu.* Where 'tis plain by *Corpus*, he means (as generally every where) only groſs Matter that may be felt and handled; as appears by theſe Words, *Si cor aut Sanguis, aut cerebrum eſt Animus, certe, quoniam eſt Corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore, ſi anima eſt, forte diſſipabitur, ſi ignis extinguetur*, Fuſc. Quæſt. L. 1. c. 11. Here *Cicero* oppoſes *Corpus* to *Ignis* and *Anima*, i. e. *Aura* or *Breath:* And the Foundation of that his diſtinction of the Soul, from that which he calls *Corpus* or Body, he gives a little lower in theſe Words, *Tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiat aciem*, ib. c. 22.

Nor

Nor was it the Heathen World alone that had this Notion of *Spirit*; the moſt enlightned of all the ancient People of God, *Solomon* himſelf, ſpeaks after the ſame manner, *That which befalleth the Sons of Men befalleth Beaſts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth ſo dieth the other, yea, they have all one Spirit.* So I tranſlate the Hebrew word רוח here, for ſo I find it tranſlated the very next Verſe but one; *Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth down to the Earth.* In which places it is plain that *Solomon* applies the word רוח and our Tranſlators of him the word *Spirit* to a Subſtance, out of which immateriality was not wholly excluded, *unleſs the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth downwards to the Earth be immaterial.* Nor did the way of Speaking in our Saviours time vary from this; St. *Luke* tells us, That when our Saviour, after his Reſurrection, ſtood in the midſt of them, *They were affrighted and*

Eccl. 3 19.

V. 21.

Ch. 24. 37.

and ſuppoſed that they had ſeen πνεῦμα, the Greek word which always anſwers *Spirit* in Engliſh; and ſo the Tranſlators of the Bible render it here, *They ſuppoſed that they had ſeen a Spirit.* But our
v. 39. Saviour ſays to them, *Behold my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my ſelf, handle me and ſee; for a Spirit hath not Fleſh and Bones, as you ſee me have.* Which Words of our Saviour put the ſame diſtinction between *Body* and *Spirit*, that *Cicero* did in the place above-cited, *viz.* That the one was a groſs Compages that could be felt and handled; and the other ſuch as
L. vi. *Virgil* deſcribes the Ghoſt or Soul of *Anchiſes*,

Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
Ter fruſtra comprenſa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucriq; ſimillima ſomno.

I would not be thought hereby to ſay, That *Spirit* never does ſignifie

nifie a purely, immaterial Subſtance. In that Senſe the Scripture, I take it, ſpeaks, when it ſays, *God is a Spirit*; and in that Senſe I have us'd it; and in that Senſe I have proved from my Principles, that there is a *ſpiritual Subſtance*; and am *certain that there is a ſpiritual* immaterial *Subſtance*: Which is, I humbly conceive, a direct Anſwer to your Lordſhips Queſtion in the beginning of this Argument, *viz. How we come to be certain that there are ſpiritual Subſtances, ſuppoſing this Principle to be true*, that the ſimple Ideas by Senſation and Reflection, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning? But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent and perfectly immaterial Spirit, ſhould pleaſe to give to a Syſtem of very ſubtil Matter, Senſe and Motion, it might, with propriety of Speech, be called *Spirit*; though materiality were not excluded out of its Complex Idea. Your Lordſhip proceeds.

P. 242. B. 4. c. 10. § 5. *It is ſaid indeed elſewhere,* "That it is repugnant to the Idea of "ſenſeleſs Matter, that it ſhould "put into it ſelf Senſe, Perception "and Knowledge. *But this doth not reach the preſent Caſe; which is not what Matter can do of it ſelf, but what Matter prepared by an Omnipotent Hand can do. And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it? We can have none from the Ideas, for thoſe are given up in this Caſe; and conſequently, we can have no certainty upon theſe Principles, whether we have any ſpiritual Subſtance within us or not.*

B. 4. c. 10. § 5. Your Lordſhip in this Paragraph proves, that from what I ſay, *We can have no certainty whether we have any* ſpiritual Subſtance *in us or not.* If by ſpiritual Subſtance your Lordſhip means an immaterial Subſtance *in us*, as you ſpeak, *p.* 246. I grant what your Lordſhip ſays is true, That it cannot, upon *theſe Principles*, be de-

demonſtrated. But I muſt crave leave to ſay at the ſame time, That upon *theſe Principles* it can be prov'd, to the higheſt degree of probability. If by *ſpiritual Subſtance* your Lordſhip means a thinking Subſtance, I muſt diſſent from your Lordſhip, and ſay, That we can *have a Certainty, upon my Principles, that there is a ſpiritual Subſtance in us.* In ſhort, my Lord, *upon* my *Principles*, *i. e.* from the *Idea* of Thinking, *we can have a certainty* that there is a thinking Subſtance in us; from hence we have a certainty that there is an Eternal *thinking Subſtance.* This thinking Subſtance, which has been from Eternity, I have proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking Subſtance, has put into us a thinking Subſtance, which whether it be a material or immaterial Subſtance, cannot be infallibly demonſtrated from our Ideas; though from them it may be proved, that it is to the higheſt degree probable that it is immaterial. B. 4. c.

This,

This, in ſhort, my Lord, is what I have to ſay on this Point; which may, in good meaſure, ſerve for an Anſwer to your Lordſhips next Leaf or two, which I ſhall ſet down, and then take notice of ſome few Particulars which I wonder to find your Lordſhip accuſe me of. Your Lordſhip ſays,

P. 242. B. 2. c. 23. §. 15.

But we are told, " That from the " Operations of our Minds, we are " able to frame a Complex Idea of " a Spirit. *How can that be, when we cannot from thoſe Ideas be aſſured, but that thoſe Operations may come from a material Subſtance? If we frame an Idea on ſuch Grounds, it is at moſt but a poſſible Idea; for it may be otherwiſe, and we can have no aſſurance from our Ideas, that it is not: So that the moſt Men may come to in this way of Ideas, is, That it is poſſible it may be ſo, and it is poſſible it may not; but that it is impoſſible for us, from our Ideas, to determine either way. And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of Reaſon?*

I am

I am very glad to find the Idea of a ſpiritual Subſtance made as conſiſtent and intelligible, as that of a Corporeal; " For as the one conſiſts " of a Coheſion of ſolid Parts, and " the Power of communicating " Motion by Impulſe, ſo the other " conſiſts in a Power of Think- " ing, and Willing, and Moving " the Body; and that the Cohe- " ſion of ſolid Parts, is as hard to " be conceived as Thinking: " And we are as much in the " Dark about the Power of com- " municating Motion by Impulſe, " as in the Power of exciting Mo- " tion by Thought. We have by " daily Experience, clear Evidence " of Motion produced, both by " Impulſe and by Thought; but " the manner how, hardly comes " within our Comprehenſion; we " are equally at a loſs in both. P. 243. §. 27. §. 28.

From whence it follows, That we may be certain of a Being of a ſpiritual Subſtance, although we have no clear and diſtinct Idea of it, nor are

able to comprehend the manner of its Operations: And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our Reaſon and Certainty is founded on clear and diſtinct Ideas; and that they have Reaſon to reject any Doctrin which relates to ſpiritual Subſtances, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the ſame thing is confeſſed by the moſt inquiſitive Men, about the manner of Operation, both in material and immaterial Subſtances.

§. 31. *It is affirmed, That* " the very No-
" tion of Body, implies ſome-
" thing very hard, if not impoſſi-
" to be explained or underſtood
" by us; and that the natural
" Conſequence of it, *viz.* Diviſi-
" bility, involves us in Difficulties
" impoſſible to be explicated, or
" made conſiſtent; That we have
" but ſome few ſuperficial Ideas
§. 32. " of Things; That we are deſti-
" tute of Faculties, to attain to
" the true Nature of them; and
" that when we do that, we fall
" preſently into Darkneſs and
" Obſcurity, and can diſcover
" no-

" nothing further, but our own
" Blindneſs and Ignorance.

Theſe are very fair and ingenious Confeſſions of the ſhortneſs of Humane Underſtanding, with reſpect to the nature and manner of ſuch Things which we are moſt certain of the Being of, by conſtant and undoubted Experience. I appeal now to the Reaſon of Mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrin propoſed to us as of Divine Revelation, becauſe we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially when it relates to the Divine Eſſence. For as the ſame Author obſerves, " Our Idea of God is §. 33, 34,
" framed from the Complex Ideas 35.
" of thoſe Perfections we find in
" our ſelves, but inlarging them
" ſo, as to make them ſuitable to
" an infinite Being, as Knowledge,
" Power, Duration, *&c.* And
" the Degrees or Extent of theſe §. 36.
" which we aſcribe to the Sove-
" reign Being, are all boundleſs
" and infinite. For it is Infinity,

" which joined to our Ideas of
" Exiſtence, Power, Know-
" ledge, *&c.* makes that Complex
" Idea, whereby we repreſent to
" our ſelves the beſt we can, the
" ſupreme Being.

Now, when our knowledge of groſs material Subſtances is ſo dark; when the Notion of ſpiritual Subſtances is above all Ideas of Senſation; when the higher any Subſtance is, the more remote from our Knowledge; but eſpecially when the very Idea of a ſupreme Being, implies its being Infinite and Incomprehenſible; I know not whether it argues more Stupidity or Arrogance, to expoſe a Doctrin relating to the Divine Eſſence, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it: But of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reaſon, from clear and diſtinct Ideas: And if we can attain to Certainty without them, and where it is confeſſed we cannot have them, as about Subſtance; then theſe cannot be the ſole Matter and Foundation of our Reaſoning, which

which is peremptorily aſſerted by this late Author.

Here, after having argued, That notwithſtanding what I ſay about our Idea of a Spirit, *'tis impoſſible, from our Ideas, to determine whether* that Spirit in us be a *material Subſtance* or no, your Lordſhip concludes the Paragraph thus: *And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?* P. 243.

I Anſwer; I think it is a way *to bring us to a Certainty* in theſe Things which I have offer'd as certain, but I never thought it a way to Certainty, where we cannot reach *Certainty*; nor ſhall I think the worſe of it, if your Lordſhip ſhould inſtance in a hundred other things, as well as the immateriality of the Spirit in us, wherein this way does not *bring us to a Certainty*; unleſs, at the ſame time, your Lordſhip ſhall ſhew us another *way* that will bring us to *Certainty* in thoſe Points, wherein

this way of Ideas failed. If your Lordſhip, or any Body elſe, will ſhew me a better way to Certainty in them, I am ready to learn, and will lay by that of Ideas. The *way of Ideas* will not, from Philoſophy, afford us a Demonſtration, that the thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial. Whereupon your Lordſhip asks, *And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?* The *way of Argument* which your Lordſhip oppoſes to the *way of Ideas*, will, I humbly conceive, from Philoſophy, as little afford us a Demonſtration, that the thinking Subſtance in us is immaterial. Whereupon, may not any one likewiſe ask, *And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon?* Is any way, I beſech your Lordſhip, to be condemned as an ill way to bring us to *Certainty*, demonſtrative *Certainty*, becauſe it brings us not to it in a Point where Reaſon cannot attain to ſuch Certainty? *Algebra* is a way to bring us to Certainty

tainty in Mathematicks; but muſt it be preſently condemn'd as an ill way, becauſe there are ſome Queſtions in Mathematicks, which a Man cannot come to Certainty in by the way of *Algebra?*

In Page 247. after having ſet down ſeveral Confeſſions of mine, *of the ſhortneſs of Humane Underſtanding*, your Lordſhip adds theſe Words; *I appeal now to the Reaſon of Mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrin propoſed to us as of Divine Revelation, becauſe we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially when it relates to the Divine Eſſence.* And I beſeech you, my Lord, where did I ever ſay ſo, or any think like it? And yet it is impoſſible for any Reader but to imagine, that that Propoſition which your Lordſhip *appeals to the Reaſon of Mankind* againſt, is a Propoſition of mine, which your Lordſhip is confuting out of *Confeſſions* of my own, great Numbers whereof ſtand quoted

out of my Eſſay, in ſeveral Pages of your Lordſhips Book, both before and after this your Lordſhips Appeal *to the Reaſon of Mankind.* And now I muſt appeal to your Lordſhip, Whether you find any ſuch Propoſition in my Book? If your Lordſhip does not, I too muſt then appeal to the Reaſon of Mankind, Whether it be reaſonable for your Lordſhip to bring ſo many *Confeſſions* out of my Book, to confute a Propoſition that is no where in it? There is, no doubt, Reaſon for it; which ſince your Lordſhip does not, that I ſee, declare, and I have not Wit enough to diſcover, I ſhall therefore leave to the Reaſon of Mankind to find out.

Your Lordſhip has, in this part of your Diſcourſe, ſpoke very much of Reaſon; as, *Is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reaſon? And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, That all our Reaſon and Certainty is found-*

P. 243.

P. 244.

ed

ed on clear and diſtinct Ideas. I appeal now to the Reaſon of Mankind. *I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reaſon.* P. 245. *The Certainty is not placed in the Idea, but in good and ſound Reaſon.* P. 246. P. 250. *Allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the Idea, but from Principles of true Reaſon.* P. 251.

What your Lordſhip ſays at the beginning of this Chapter, in theſe Words, *We muſt conſider what we underſtand by Reaſon*, P. 230. made me hope I ſhould here find what your Lordſhip *underſtands by Reaſon* explained, that ſo I might rectifie my Notion of it, and ſo might be able to avoid the Obſcurity and Confuſion which very much perplex moſt of the Diſcourſes, wherein it is appealed to or from as Judge. But notwithſtanding the Explication I flattered my ſelf with the hopes of, from what I thought your Lordſhip had promiſed, I find no other account of *Reaſon*, but in Quotations out of others, which

which your Lordſhip juſtly blames. Had I been ſo happy as to have been inlightened in this Point by your Lordſhips learned Pen, ſo as to have ſeen diſtinctly what your Lordſhip *underſtands by Reaſon*, I ſhould poſſibly have excuſed my ſelf from giving your Lordſhip the trouble of theſe Papers, and been able to have perceived, without applying my ſelf any farther to your Lordſhip, how ſo much of my *Eſſay* came into a Chapter, which was deſigned to anſwer *Objections againſt the Trinity, in point of Reaſon*. It follows.

P. 246. *But I go yet farther: And as I have already ſhewed, we can have no Certainty of an immaterial Subſtance within us, from theſe ſimple Ideas; ſo I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from them, by their own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.* And then your Lordſhip

ſhip goes on to give an Account of my Proof of a God; which your Lordſhip cloſes with theſe Words.

That which I deſign is to ſhew, That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it; which was the thing I intended to prove. P. 252.

If this be *the thing your Lordſhip deſigned*, I am then at a loſs who your Lordſhip deſign'd it againſt; for I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, That we could not be convinced by Reaſon of any Truth, but where all the *Ideas* concerned in that Conviction, were *clear and diſtinct*; for Knowledge and Certainty, in my Opinion, lies in the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of Ideas, ſuch as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and diſtinct Ideas. Though thoſe I muſt own, the clearer and more diſtinct they

they are, contribute very much to our more clear and distinct Reasoning and Discoursing about them. But yet in some Cases we may have Certainty about obscure Ideas; *v. g.* by the clear Idea of *Thinking* in me, I find the Agreement of the clear Idea of *Existence*, and the obscure Idea of a *Substance* in me, because I perceive the necessary Agreement of *Thinking*, and the relative Idea of a *Support*; which Support, without having any clear and distinct Idea of what it is, beyond this relative one of a *Support*, I call *Substance*.

If your Lordship *intended* this against another who has said, *clear and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning*; it seems very strange to me, that your Lordship should *intend* it against one, and quote only the Words of another. For above Ten Pages before, your Lordship had quoted nothing but my Book; and in the immediate preceding Paragraph

graph bring a large Quotation out of the 10th Sect. of the 10th Chapter of my 4th Book; of which your Lordſhip ſays, *This is the Subſtance of the Argument uſed, to prove an infinite, ſpiritual Being, which I am far from weakning the force of; but that which I deſign is to ſhew, That the Certainty of it is not placed upon clear and diſtinct Ideas.* P. 251. Whom now, I beſeech your Lordſhip, can this be underſtood to be intended againſt, but me? For how can my uſing an *Argument*, whoſe *Certainty is not placed upon clear and diſtinct Ideas*, prove any thing againſt another Man who ſays, That *clear and diſtinct Ideas are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning?* This proves only againſt him that uſes the Argument; and therefore either I muſt be ſuppoſed here to hold, That clear and diſtinct Ideas are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning, (which I do not remember that I ever ſaid) or elſe that your Lordſhip here proves againſt no Body.

But

But though I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, That *clear and diſtinct Ideas* are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning; yet I do own, That ſimple Ideas are the Foundations of all our Knowledge, if that be it which your Lordſhip queſtions: And therefore I muſt think my ſelf concerned in what your Lordſhip ſays in this very place, *p.* 246. in theſe Words, *I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from theſe ſimple Ideas, by* THEIR *own Confeſſion concerning the Exiſtence of God himſelf.*

This being ſpoken in the Plural Number, cannot be underſtood to be meant of the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, and no Body elſe: And who can any Reader reaſonably apply it to, but the Author of *The Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, ſince beſides that it ſtands in the midſt of a great many Quotations out of that Book, without any other Perſon being named, or

any

any ones Words but mine quoted? My Proof alone of a Deity is brought out of that Book, to make good what your Lordſhip here ſays; and no Body elſe is any where mentioned or quoted concerning it.

The ſame way of ſpeaking of the Perſons you are arguing againſt in the Plural Number, your Lordſhip uſes in other places; as, *Which THEY may call a Complication of ſimple Ideas, if THEY pleaſe.* P. 238.

We do not envy THESE Pretenders to Reaſon; but methinks THEY ſhould not at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them. And all along in that Page THEY. And in the very next Page my Words being quoted, your Lordſhip asks, *How that can be, when the ſame PERSONS ſay, That notwithſtanding THEIR Ideas, it is poſſible for Mat-* P. 240. P. 241.

Matter to think. So that I do not ſee how I can exempt my ſelf from being meant to be one of thoſe Pretenders to Reaſon, wherewith we can be certain without any Foundation of Reaſon; which your Lordſhip, in the immediate
P. 240. foregoing Page *does not envy for this new ſort of Certainty.* How can it be underſtood but that I am one of thoſe Perſons, That *at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them?* Tho' your Lordſhip very civilly ſays, *p.* 239. That *you muſt do that right to the Ingenious Author of* The Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding *(from whence theſe Notions are borrowed, to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them) that*, &c. yet, methinks, it is the Author himſelf, and his Uſe of theſe Notions, that is blamed and argued againſt; but ſtill in the Plural Number, which he confeſſes himſelf not to underſtand.

My

My Lord, if your Lordſhip can ſhew me where I pretend to *Reaſon* or *Certainty*, without any Foundation of Reaſon; or where it is I aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of any Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them, your Lordſhip will do me a great Favour; for this I grant is *a new ſort of Certainty* which I long to be rid of, and to diſown to the World. But truly, my Lord, *as I pretend to no new ſort of Certainty*, but juſt ſuch as *Humane Underſtanding* was poſſeſſed of before I was born; and ſhould be glad I could get more out of the Books and Writings that come abroad in my Days. So, my Lord, if I have any where *pretended to any new ſort of Certainty*, I beſeech your Lordſhip ſhew me the place, that I may correct the Vanity of it, and unſay it to the World.

Again, your Lordſhip ſays thus, *I know not whether it argues more Stu-* P. 246.

pidity or Arrogance, to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence, because THEY *cannot comprehend the manner of it.*

Here, my Lord, I find the same THEY again, which some Pages back, evidently involved me; and since that you have named no Body besides me, nor alledged any Bodies Writings but mine; give me leave, therefore, to ask your Lordship, Whether I am one of these THEY here also, that I may know whether I am concerned to answer for my self? I am ashamed to importune your Lordship so often about the same Matter; but I meet with so many places in your Lordships (I had almost said *new*) way of Writing, that put me to a stand, not knowing whether I am meant or no, that I am at a loss whether I should clear my self from what possibly your Lordship does not lay to my Charge, and yet the Reader, thinking it meant of me, should con-

conclude that to be in my Book which is not there, and which I utterly diſown.

Though I cannot be joined with thoſe who *expoſe* a *Doctrin relating to the Divine Eſſence, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it*; unleſs your Lordſhip can ſhew where I have ſo *expoſed* it, which I deny that I have any where done; yet your Lordſhip, before you come to the bottom of the ſame Page, has theſe Words, *I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from them, by* THEIR *own Confeſſion concerning the Exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.* P. 246. P. 246.

If your Lordſhip did mean me in that THEY which is ſome Lines backwards, I muſt complain to your Lordſhip that you have done me an Injury, in imputing that to me which I have not done. And if THEIR

here were not meant by your Lordſhip to relate to the ſame Perſons, I ask by what ſhall the Reader diſtinguiſh them? And how ſhall any Body know who it is your Lordſhip means? For that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Eſſay in the very next Words, and arguing againſt it in the following Pages.

I enter not here into your Lordſhips Argument; that which I am now conſidering is your Lordſhips peculiar way of Writing in this part of your Treatiſe, which makes me often in a Doubt whether the Reader will not condemn my Book upon your Lordſhips Authority, where he thinks me concerned, if I ſay nothing; and yet your Lordſhip may look upon my Defence as ſuperfluous, when I did not hold what your Lordſhip argued againſt.

But to go on with your Lordſhips Argument, your Lord-

Lordſhip ſays, *I ſhall now ſhew that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from ſimple Ideas by their own Confeſſion, concerning the Exiſtence of the moſt ſpiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.* P. 246.

Your Lordſhips way of proving it, is this. Your Lordſhip ſays, *We are told*, Book iv. Chap. 10. Sect. 1. " That the Evidence " of it is equal to Mathematical " Certainty; *and very good Arguments are brought to it, in a Chapter on purpoſe: But that which I take notice of, is, that the Argument, from the clear and diſtinct Idea of God, is paſſed over.* Suppoſing all this to be ſo, your Lordſhip methinks, with Submiſſion, does not prove the Propoſition you undertook, which was this; *There can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from ſimple Ideas, by their own Confeſſion concerning* [*i. e.* to prove] *the Exiſtence of a God.* For if I did in that Chapter, as your Lordſhip ſays, *Paſs over the Proof from the* P. 245.

clear and diſtinct Idea of God, that I preſume is no *Confeſſion that there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought* from *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, much leſs from *ſimple Ideas*, *concerning the Exiſtence of a God*; becauſe the uſing of one Argument brought from one Foundation, is no Confeſſion that there is not another *Principle* or *Foundation*. But, my my Lord, I ſhall not inſiſt upon this, whether it be a *Confeſſion* or no.

Leaving *Confeſſion* out of the Propoſition, I humbly conceive your Lordſhips Argument does not prove. Your Lordſhips Propoſition to be proved, is, *There can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from ſimple Ideas to prove the Exiſtence of a God*; and your Lordſhips Reaſon is, becauſe *the Argument from the CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEA OF GOD, is omitted* in my proof of a God. I will ſuppoſe, for the ſtrengthing your Lordſhips Reaſoning in the

the Caſe, that I had ſaid (which I am far enough from ſaying) That there was no other Argument to prove the Exiſtence of God, but what I had uſed in that Chapter; yet, my Lord, with all this, your Lordſhips Argument, I humbly conceive, would not hold; for I might bring Evidence from ſimple *Ideas*, though I brought none from the *Idea of God*; for the Idea we have of God is a complex and no *ſimple Idea*. So that the Terms being changed from *ſimple Ideas*, to a *clear and diſtinct* complex *Idea of God*, the Propoſition which was undertaken to be proved, ſeems to me unproved.

Your Lordſhips next Words are, *How can this be conſiſtent with deducing our Certainty of Knowledge from clear and ſimple Ideas?* P. 247.

Here your Lordſhip joins ſomething that is mine, with ſomething that is not mine. I do ſay, That all our Knowledge is founded

in ſimple Ideas; but I do not ſay, it is all *deduced from clear Ideas*; much leſs that we cannot have any *certain* Knowledge of the Exiſtence of any thing, whereof we have not a clear, diſtinct, complex Idea; or, that the complex Idea muſt be clear enough to be in its ſelf the Evidence of the Exiſtence of that thing; which ſeems to be your Lordſhips meaning here. Our Knowledge is all founded on *ſimple Ideas*, as I have before explained, though not always about *ſimple Ideas*; for we may know the Truth of Propoſitions which include *complex Ideas*, and thoſe complex Ideas may not always be perfectly clear Ideas.

Page 247. In the remaining part of this Page, it follows; *I do not go about to juſtifie thoſe* who lay the whole Streſs upon the Foundation; *which I grant to be too weak to ſupport ſo important a Truth*; *and that thoſe are very much to blame who* go about to

to invalidate other Arguments for the ſake of that ; *but I doubt all that talk about* clear and diſtinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty, *came originally from theſe Diſcourſes or Meditations, which are aimed at. The Author of them was an ingenious thinking Man, and he endeavoured to lay the Foundation of Certainty, as well as he could. The firſt Thing he found any Certainty in, was his own Exiſtence ; which he founded upon the Perceptions of the Acts of his Mind, which ſome call an internal, infallible Perception that we are. From hence he proceeded to enquire, How we came by this Certainty? And he reſolved it into this, That he had a clear and diſtinct Perception of it ; and from hence he formed this general Rule, That what he had a clear and diſtinct Perception of, was true. Which in Reaſon ought to go no farther, than where there is the like degree of Evidence.*

This Account which your Lordſhip gives here, what it was where-

in

in *Deſcartes* laid the Foundation of Certainty, containing nothing in it to ſhew what your Lordſhip propoſed here, *viz.* *That there can be no ſufficient Evidence brought from Ideas, by my own Confeſſion concerning the Exiſtence of God himſelf.* I willingly excuſe my ſelf from troubling your Lordſhip concerning it, only I crave leave to make my Acknowledgment to your Lordſhip, for what you are pleaſed, by the way, to drop in theſe Words; *But I doubt all this Talk about clear and diſtinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty, came originally from theſe Diſcourſes or Meditations, which are aimed at.*

By the Quotations in your Lordſhips immediately preceding Words taken out of my Eſſay, which relate to that *ingenious, thinking Author*, as well as by what in your following Words is ſaid of his *founding Certainty in his own Exiſtence*, it is hard to avoid thinking that your Lordſhip

† B. 4. c. 10. §. 7.

ſhip means, that I borrowed from him my Notions concerning *Certainty*. And your Lordſhip is ſo great a Man, and every way ſo far above my Meanneſs, that it cannot be ſuppoſed that your Lordſhip intended this for any thing but a Commendation of me to the World, as the Scholar of ſo great a Maſter. But though I muſt always acknowledge to that juſtly admired Gentleman, the great Obligation of my firſt Deliverance from the unintelligible way of talking of the Philoſophy in uſe in the Schools in his time, yet I am ſo far from entitling his Writings to any of the Errors or Imperfections which are to be found in my Eſſay, as deriving their *Original* from him, that I muſt own to your Lordſhip they were ſpun barely out of my own Thoughts, reflecting as well as I could on my own Mind, and the Ideas I had there, and were not, that I know, derived from any other *Original*. But, poſſibly, I all this while aſ-

ſume

ſume to my ſelf an Honour which your Lordſhip did not intend to me by this Intimation; for tho' what goes before and after, ſeems to appropriate thoſe Words to me, yet ſome part of them brings me under my uſual Doubt, which I ſhall remain under till I know whom theſe Words, *viz. This Talk about clear and diſtinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty*, belong to.

The remaining part of this Paragraph contains a Diſcourſe of your Lordſhips upon *Deſcartes*'s general Rule of Certainty, in theſe
P. 248. Words; *For the* Certainty *here was not grounded on the clearneſs of the* Perception, *but on the plainneſs of the Evidence, which is of that nature, that the very* doubting *of it proves it; ſince it is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould doubt or queſtion its own Being, that had it not. So that here it is not* the clearneſs of the Idea, *but an immediate Act of Perception which is the true Ground of Certainty.*

And

And this cannot extend to things without our ſelves, of which we can have no other Perception, than what is cauſed by the Impreſſions of outward Objects. But whether we are to judge according to theſe Impreſſions, doth not depend on the Ideas themſelves, but upon the exerciſe of our Judgment and Reaſon about them, which put the difference between true and falſe, and adequate and inadequate Ideas. So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themſelves, but from the Evidence of Reaſon, that thoſe Ideas are true and juſt, and conſequently that we may build our Certainty upon them.

Granting all this to be ſo, yet I muſt confeſs, my Lord, I do not ſee how it any ways tends to ſhew either your Lordſhips Proof or my *Confeſſion*, that my Proof of an *infinite, ſpiritual Being, is not placed upon Ideas*, which is what your Lordſhip profeſſes to be your Deſign here.

But

But though we are not yet come to your Lordſhips proof, That the *Certainty* in my proof of a Deity is not placed on Ideas, yet I crave leave to conſider what your Lordſhip ſays here concerning *Certainty*, about which one cannot imploy too many Thoughts to find wherein it is placed. Your Lordſhip ſays, That *Deſcartes*'s Certainty *was not grounded on the clearneſs of the Perception, but on the plainneſs of the Evidence.* And a little lower, *Here* (*i. e.* in *Deſcartes*'s Foundation of Certainty) *it is not the clearneſs of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Percepton, on which is the true Ground of* Certainty. And a little lower, *That in things without us, our* Certainty *is not from the Ideas, but from the Evidence of Reaſon that thoſe Ideas are true and juſt.*

Your Lordſhip, I hope, will pardon my Dulneſs, if after your Lordſhip has placed the Grounds of Certainty of our own Exiſtence,

ſtence, ſometimes *in the plainneſs of the Evidence*, in oppoſition *to the clearneſs of the Perception*; ſometimes in the *immediate Act of Perception*, in oppoſition *to the clearneſs of the Idea*, and the Certainty of other things without us, *in the Evidence of Reaſon that theſe Ideas are true and juſt*, in oppoſition *to the Ideas themſelves*. I know not, by theſe Rules, wherein to place *Certainty*; and therefore ſtick to my own plain way, by Ideas, delivered in theſe Words, "Where- P. 248.
"ever we perceive the Agreement B. 4. c. 4. § 8.
"or Diſagreement of any of our
"Ideas, there is *certain* Know-
"ledge; and where-ever we are
"ſure thoſe Ideas agree with the
"reality of Things, there is *cer-*
"*tain real Knowledge*. Of which
"Agreement of our Ideas with
"the reality of Things, I think I
"have ſhewn wherein it is that
"*Certainty*, *real Certainty*, conſiſts.
Whereof more may be ſeen in Chap. 6. in which, if your Lordſhip find any Miſtakes, I ſhall take

take it as a great Honour to be ſet right by you.

Your Lordſhip, as far as I can gueſs your Meaning (for I muſt own I do not clearly comprehend it) ſeems to me, in the foregoing Paſſage, to oppoſe this Aſſertion, That the *Certainty* of the Being of any Thing, might be made out *from the Idea* of that Thing. Truly, my Lord, I am ſo far from ſaying (or thinking) ſo, that I never knew any one of that Mind but *Deſcartes*, and ſome that have followed him in his Proof of a God, from the Idea which we have of God in us; which I was ſo far from thinking a ſufficient Ground of Certainty, that your Lordſhip makes uſe of my denying or doubting of it, againſt me, as we ſhall ſee in the following Words, *p.* 248.

But the Idea of an infinite Being has this peculiar to it, that neceſſary Exiſtence is imply'd in it. This is a clear

clear and diſtinct Idea, *and yet it is denied that this doth prove the Exiſtence of God. How then can the Grounds of our* Certainty *ariſe from* clear and diſtinct Ideas, *when in one of the cleareſt Ideas of our Minds, we can come to no Certainty by it?*

Your Lordſhips Proof here, as far as I comprehend it, ſeems to be, that it is confeſs'd, *That* Certainty *does not ariſe from clear and diſtinct Ideas*, becauſe *it is denied that the clear and diſtinct Ideas of an infinite Being, that implies neceſſary Exiſtence in it, does prove the Exiſtence of a God.*

Here your Lordſhip ſays *it is denied*; and in five Lines after you recal that Saying, and uſe theſe Words, *I do not ſay that it is denied, to prove it:* Which of theſe two Sayings of your Lordſhips muſt I now anſwer too? If your Lordſhip ſays *it is denied*, I fear that will not hold to be ſo in Matter

of Fact, which made your Lordſhip unſay it; though that being moſt to your Lordſhips purpoſe, occaſioned, I ſuppoſe, its dropping from your Pen. For if it be not denied, I think the whole Force of your Lordſhips Argument fails. But your Lordſhip helps that out as well as the thing will bear, by the Words that follow in the Sentence, which altogether ſtands thus; *I do not ſay, that it is denied, to prove it; but this is ſaid that it is a doubtful thing*, " from the different make of Mens " Tempers, and application of " their Thoughts. *What can this mean, unleſs it be to let us know that even* clear and diſtinct Ideas *may loſe their effect, by the difference of Mens Tempers and Studies? So that beſides* Ideas, *in order to a right Judgment, a due Temper and application of the Mind is required.*

If I meant in thoſe Words of mine, quoted here by your Lordſhip, juſt as your Lordſhip concludes

cludes they mean, I know not why I ſhould be aſhamed of it; for I never thought that Ideas, *even* the moſt *clear and diſtinct*, would make Men certain of what might be demonſtrated from them, unleſs they were of a Temper to conſider, and would apply their Minds to them. There are no Ideas more clear and diſtinct than thoſe of Numbers, and yet there are a thouſand Demonſtrations concerning Numbers, which Millions of Men do not know, (and ſo have not the Certainty about them they might have) for want of *Application.*

I could not avoid here to take this to my Self: For this Paſſage of your Lordſhips is pinned down upon me ſo cloſe, by your Lordſhips citing the 7th Sect. of the 10th Chapter of my 4th Book, that I am forced here to anſwer for my ſelf; which I ſhall do, after having firſt ſet down my Words, as they ſtand in the Place

B. 4. c. 10. §. 7. quoted by your Lordſhip. " How " far the Idea of a moſt perfect " Being, which a Man may frame " in his Mind, does or does not " prove the exiſtence of a God, " I will not here Examine. For " in the different make of Mens " Tempers and application of their " Thoughts, ſome *Arguments* pre- " vail more on one, and ſome on " another, for the Confirmation " of the ſame Truth. But yet, I " think, this I may ſay, That it " is an ill way of eſtabliſhing this " Truth, and ſilencing Atheiſts, to " lay the whole ſtreſs of ſo impor- " tant a Point, as this, upon that " ſole Foundation, and take ſome " Mens having that Idea of God " in their Minds (for 'tis evident, " ſome Men have none, and ſome " a worſe than none, and the moſt " very different) for the only Proof " of a Deity; and out of an over- " fondneſs of that Darling-Inven- " tion, caſhier, or at leaſt endea- " vour to invalidate all other Ar- " guments, and forbid us to hear-

" ken

" ken to thoſe Proofs, as being
" weak, or fallacious, which our
" own Exiſtence, and the ſenſible
" Parts of the Univerſe, offer ſo
" clearly and cogently to our
" Thoughts, that I deem it im-
" poſſible for a conſidering Man
" to withſtand them. For I judge
" it as certain and clear a Truth,
" as can any where be delivered,
" That the inviſible Things of
" God are clearly ſeen from the
" Creation of the World, being
" underſtood by the Things that
" are made, even his Eternal Pow-
" er and God-head.

The meaning of which Words of mine, were not to deny that the Idea of a moſt perfect Being doth *prove a God*, but to blame thoſe who take it for the *only Proof* and *indeavour to invalidate all others.* For the Belief of a God being, as I ſay in the ſame Section, the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Morality, I thought no *Arguments* that are made uſe of to work the

perſwaſion of a God into Mens Minds, ſhould be invalidated: And the Reaſon I give why they ſhould all be left to their full Strength, and none of them rejected as unfit to be hearken'd to, is this. Becauſe " in the different " make of Mens Tempers and ap- " plication of their Thoughts, " ſome *Arguments* prevail more " on one, and ſome on another, " for the Confirmation of the ſame " Truth. So that my Meaning here was not as your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, to ground Certainty *on the different make of Mens Tempers, and application of their Thoughts*, in oppoſition to *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as is very evident from my Words; but to ſhew of what ill Conſequence it is, to go about to invalidate any *Argument*, which hath a tendency to ſettle the Belief of a God in any ones Mind; becauſe in the difference of Mens Tempers and Application, ſome *Arguments* prevail more on one, and ſome on another; So that I Speaking of *Belief*,

Belief, and your Lordſhip, as I take it, ſpeaking in that place of *Certainty*, nothing can (I crave leave to ſay) be inferr'd from theſe Words of mine to your Lordſhips purpoſe. And that I meant *Belief*, and not *Certainty*, is evident from hence, That I look upon the Argument there ſpoke of, as not concluſive, and ſo not able to produce Certainty in any one, though I did not know how far it might prevail on ſome Mens Perſwaſions to confirm them in the Truth. And ſince not all, nor the moſt of thoſe that believe a God, are at the Pains, or have the Skill, to examine and clearly comprehend the Demonſtrations of his Being, I was unwilling to ſhew the weakneſs of the Argument there ſpoke of, ſince poſſibly by it, ſome Men might be confirmed in the *Belief* of a God, which is enough to preſerve in them true Sentiments of Religion and Morality.

Your Lordſhip hereupon asks, P. 249. *Wherein is this different from*

what all Men of Underſtanding have ſaid?

I Anſwer, In nothing that I know; nor did I ever, that I remember, ſay that it was. Your Lordſhip goes on to demand,

P. 249. *Why then ſhould theſe clear and ſimple Ideas be made the ſole Foundation of Reaſon?*

I Anſwer, That I know not: They muſt give your Lordſhip a Reaſon for it, who have *made CLEAR Ideas the ſole Foundation of Reaſon.* Why I have made *ſimple* ones the Foundation of all Knowledge, I have ſhewn. Your Lordſhip goes on.

P. 249. *One would think by this.*

By what, I beſeech your Lordſhip?

That theſe Ideas would preſently ſatisfie Mens Minds, if they attended to them.

What

What *thoſe Ideas* are from which your Lordſhip *would* expect ſuch preſent Satisfaction, and upon what Grounds your Lordſhip expects it, I do not know. But this I will venture to ſay, That all the ſatisfaction *Mens Minds* can have in their Enquiries after Truth and *Certainty*, is to be had only from conſidering, obſerving and rightly laying together of Ideas, ſo as to find out their Agreement or Diſagreement, and no other way.

But I do not think Ideas have Truth and Certainty always ſo ready to ſatisfie the Mind in its Enquiries, that there needs no more to be *ſatisfied*, than to *attend to them* as one does to a Man, whom one asks a Queſtion to be ſatisfied; which your Lordſhips way of Expreſſion ſeems to me to intimate. But they muſt be conſidered well, and their Habitudes examined, and where their Agreement or Diſagreement cannot be per-

perceived by an immediate Compariſon, other Ideas muſt be found out to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe under Conſideration, and then all laid in a due order, before the Mind can be ſatisfied in the Certainty of that Truth, which it is ſeeking after. This, my Lord, requires often a little more Time and Pains, than *attending* to a Tale that is told for *preſent Satisfaction*. And I believe ſome of the incomparable Mr. *Newton*'s wonderful Demonſtrations coſt him ſo much Pains, that though they were all founded in nothing but ſeveral Ideas of Quantity, yet thoſe Ideas did not *preſently ſatisfie his Mind*, though they were ſuch that with great application and labour of Thought, they were able to ſatisfie him with *Certainty*, i. e. produce Demonſtration. Your Lordſhip adds,

P. 249. *But even this will not do as to the Idea of an infinite Being.*

Though

Though the complex Idea for which the ſound *God* ſtands (whether containing in it the Idea of neceſſary Exiſtence or no, for the Caſe is the ſame) will not prove the real Exiſtence of a Being anſwering that Idea, any more than any other Idea in any ones Mind, will prove the Exiſtence of any real Being anſwering that Idea; yet, I humbly conceive, it does not hence follow, but that there may be other Ideas by which the Being of a God may be proved. For no Body that I know ever ſaid, that every Idea would prove every thing, or that an Idea in Mens Minds would prove the Exiſtence of ſuch a real Being; and therefore if this Idea fails to prove, what is propoſed to be proved by it, it is no more an Exception againſt *the way of Ideas*, than it would be an Exception againſt the way of a *medius terminus*, in arguing that ſome Body uſed one that did not prove. It follows,

P. 249. *It is not enough to ſay* THEY will not examine how far it will hold; *for* THEY *ought either to ſay, That it doth hold, or give up this Ground of Certainty from* clear and diſtinct Ideas.

Here, my Lord, I am got again into the Plural Number: But not knowing any Body but my ſelf who has uſed theſe Words which are ſet down out of my *Eſſay*, and which you are in this and the foregoing Paragraph arguing againſt, I am forced to beg your Lordſhip to let me know, who thoſe Perſons are whom your Lordſhip, joining with me, intitles with me to theſe Words of my Book; or to whom your Lordſhip joining me, intitles me by theſe Words of mine, to what they have publiſh'd, that I may ſee how far I am anſwerable for them.

Now as to the Words themſelves, *viz. I will not examine how far*

far the Idea propoſed *does or does not prove the Exiſtence of a God,* becauſe they are mine; and your Lordſhip excepts againſt them, and tells me, *It was not enough to ſay,* " I will not examine, *&c. For I ought* either to have ſaid, *That it doth hold, or give up this Ground of Certainty from clear and diſtinct Ideas.* I will anſwer as well as I can.

I could not then, my Lord, well ſay, *That that doth hold,* which I thought did not hold; but I imagin'd I might, without entring into the *examen*, and ſhewing the Weakneſs of that Argument, paſs it by with ſaying, *I would not examine*, and ſo left it with this Thought, *Valeat quantum valere poteſt.*

But though I did this and ſaid not then, *It will hold*, nay think now *it will not hold,* yet I do not ſee how from thence I was then, or

or am now under any Neceſſity to give up the *Ground of Certainty from Ideas*, becauſe the *Ground of Certainty from Ideas* may be right, though in the preſent Inſtance a right uſe were not made of them, or a right Idea was not made uſe of to produce the Certainty ſought. Ideas in Mathematicks are a ſure Ground of Certainty; and yet every one may not make ſo right a uſe of them, as to attain to Certainty by them: But yet any ones failing of Certainty by them, is not the overturning of this Truth, That Certainty is to be had by them. *Clear and diſtinct* I have omitted here to join with *Ideas*, not becauſe *clear* and *diſtinct* make any Ideas unfit to produce Certainty, which have all other fitneſs to do it; but becauſe I do not limit Certainty to *clear* and *diſtinct Ideas* only, ſince there may be Certainty from Ideas that are not in all their parts perfectly *clear* and *diſtinct*.

Your

Your Lordſhip, in the following Paragraph, endeavours to ſhew, That I have not proved the Being of a God by Ideas; and from thence, with an Argument not unlike the preceding, you conclude, That Ideas cannot be the *Grounds of Certainty*, becauſe I have not grounded my Proof of a God on Ideas. To which way of Argumentation I muſt crave leave here again to reply, That your Lordſhips ſuppoſing, as you do, that there is another way to Certainty, which is not that *of Ideas*, it does not prove that *Certainty* may not be had from Ideas, becauſe I make uſe of that other way. This being premiſed, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, That my Proof of a Deity is all grounded on Ideas, however your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call it by other Names. Your Lordſhips Words are,

But inſtead of the proper Argument from Ideas, we are told, That P. 249.

" from

§. 6. " from the Consideration of our " Selves, and what we find in our " own Constitutions, our Reason " leads us to the Knowledge of " this certain and evident Truth; " That there is an eternal, most " powerful, and most knowing Be- " ing. *All which I readily yield; but we see plainly, the Certainty is not placed in the Idea, but in good and sound Reason*, from the Consideration of our Selves and our Constitutions. *What! in the Idea of our Selves? No certainly.*

Give me leave, my Lord, to ask where I ever said, That *Certainty was placed in the Idea*, which your Lordship urges my Words as a Contradiction of? I think I never said so. 1. Because I do not remember it. 2. Because your Lordship has not quoted any place where I have said so. 3. Because I all along in my Book, which has the Honour to be so often quoted here by your Lordship, say the quite contrary. For I *place* Certainty

tainty where I think every Body will find it, and no where elſe, *viz.* In the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas; ſo that in my Opinion, it is impoſſible to be placed in any one ſingle *Idea*, ſimple or complex. I muſt own, That I think Certainty grounded on Ideas: And therefore to make your Lordſhips Words here, as I think they are meant, in oppoſition to what I ſay, I ſhall take the liberty to change your Lordſhips Words here, *What! in the Idea of our ſelves? No certainly*; into Words uſed by your Lordſhip in the foregoing Page, to the ſame purpoſe, *What! Can the Grounds of our Certainty ariſe from the Idea of our ſelves? No certainly.*

To which permit me, my Lord; with due reſpect to reply, Yes *Certainly.* The Certainty of the Being of a God in my Proof, is grounded *on the Idea of our ſelves*, as we are thinking Beings. But

your Lordſhip urges my own Words, which are, That " from " the Conſideration of our ſelves, " and what we find in our Con- " ſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us " to the knowledge of this cer- " tain and evident Truth.

My Lord, I muſt confeſs I never thought, That the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what we find in our own Conſtitutions, excluded the Conſideration of the Idea either of *Being* or of *Thinking*, two of the Ideas that make a part of the complex Idea a Man has of himſelf. If Conſideration of our ſelves excludes thoſe Ideas, I may be charged with ſpeaking improperly; but 'tis plain, nevertheleſs, that I ground the Proof of a God on thoſe Ideas, and I thought I ſpoke properly enough; when meaning, That the Conſideration of thoſe Ideas, which our own Being offered us, and ſo finding their agreement or diſagreement with others, we were thereby,

i. e.

i. e. by thus Reaſoning, ledd into the Knowledge of the Exiſtence of the firſt infinite Being, *i. e.* of God. I expreſſed it as I did, in the more familiar way of ſpeaking; for my purpoſe, in that Chapter, being to make out the Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a God, and not to prove that it was by Ideas, I thought it moſt proper to expreſs my ſelf in the moſt uſual and familiar way, to let it the eaſier into Mens Minds, by common Words and known ways of Expreſſion: And therefore, as I think, I have ſcarce uſed the word *Idea* in that whole Chapter, but only in that one place, where my ſpeaking againſt laying the whole Proof only upon our Idea of a moſt perfect Being, obliged me to it.

But your Lordſhip ſays, That in this way of coming to a certain Knowledge of the Being of a God, " from the Conſideration of our " ſelves, and what we find in our " own Conſtitutions, *the Certainty*

is placed in good and ſound Reaſon. I hope ſo. *But not in the Idea.*

What your Lordſhip here means by not placed *in the Idea*, I confeſs I do not well underſtand; but if your Lordſhip means that it is not grounded on *the Ideas* of *Thinking* and *Exiſtence* before-mentioned, and the comparing of them, and finding their Agreement or Diſagreement with other Ideas, that I muſt take the liberty to diſſent from: For in this Senſe it may be placed in Ideas, and in *good and ſound Reaſon too*, i. e. in Reaſon rightly managing thoſe Ideas, ſo as to produce Evidence by them. So that, my Lord, I muſt own I ſee not the force of the Argument, which ſays, not *in Ideas but in ſound Reaſon*; ſince I ſee no ſuch oppoſition between them, but that *Ideas* and *ſound Reaſon* may conſiſt together. For Inſtance: When a Man would ſhew the Certainty of this Truth, That the three Angles of a Triangle, are equal to two right

right ones: The firſt thing probably that he does, is to draw a Diagram. What is the uſe of that Diagram? but ſteadily to ſuggeſt to his Mind thoſe ſeveral Ideas he would make uſe of in that Demonſtration. The conſidering and laying theſe together in ſuch order, and with ſuch connection, as to make the agreement of the Ideas of the three Angles of the Triangle, with the Ideas of two right ones to be perceived, is call'd *right Reaſoning*, and is the Buſineſs of that Faculty which we call *Reaſon*; which when it operates rightly, by conſidering and comparing Ideas ſo as to produce Certainty, this Shewing or Demonſtration that the thing is ſo, is call'd *good and ſound Reaſon*. The Ground of this Certainty lies in Ideas themſelves, and their agreement or diſagreement, which Reaſon neither does nor can alter, but only lays them ſo together as to make it perceivable; and without ſuch a due conſideration and or-

dering of the Ideas, Certainty could not be had; and thus Certainty is placed *both in Ideas, and in good and ſound Reaſon.*

This affords an eaſie Anſwer to your Lordſhips next Words, brought to prove, That the Certainty of a God is not placed on the Idea of our ſelves. They ſtand thus.

P. 250. *For let our Idea be taken which way we pleaſe, by* Senſation *or* Reflection, *yet it is not the Idea that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our ſelves.*

Nothing truer than *that it is not the Idea that makes us certain* without *Reaſon*, or without the *Underſtanding*. But it is as true, That 'tis not *Reaſon*, 'tis not the Underſtanding, *that makes us certain* without *Ideas*. 'Tis not the Sun makes me certain it is Day, without my Eyes; nor 'tis not my Sight makes me

me certain it is Day, without the Sun; but the one imploy'd about the other. Nor is it one *Idea* by it ſelf, that in this or any Caſe, *makes us certain*; but Certainty conſiſts in the perceived agreement or diſagreement of all the Ideas, that ſerve to ſhew the agreement or diſagreement of diſtinct Ideas, as they ſtand in the Propoſition, whoſe Truth or Falſhood we would be certain of. The uſing of intermediate Ideas to ſhew this is called *Argumentation*, and the Ideas ſo uſed in train, *an Argument*; ſo that in my poor Opinion, to ſay, *That the Argument makes us certain*, is no more than ſaying, *The Ideas* made uſe of, *make us certain.*

The Idea of *Thinking* in our ſelves, which we receive by Reflection, we may by intermediate Ideas, perceive to have a neceſſary agreement and connection with the Idea of the Exiſtence of an *eternal, thinking Being*. This,

whether your Lordſhip will call placing *of Certainty in the Idea*, or *placing the Certainty in Reaſon*; whether your Lordſhip will ſay, *It is not the Idea that gives us the Certainty, but the Argument*, is indifferent to me; I ſhall not be ſo unmannerly as to preſcribe to your Lordſhip what way you ſhould Speak, in this or any other Matter. But this your Lordſhip will give me leave to ſay, That let it be called how your Lordſhip pleaſes, there is no Contradiction in it to what I have ſaid concerning Certainty, or the way how we came by it, or the Ground on which I place it. Your Lordſhip farther urges my Words out of the 5th Sect. of the ſame Chapter.

P. 250. But "we find in our ſelves Perception and Knowledge. *Its very true. But how doth this prove there is a God? Is it from* the clear and diſtinct Idea *of it? No, but from this Argument*, That "either "there muſt have been a knowing Being

" Being from Eternity, or an un-
" knowing, for ſomething muſt
" have been from Eternity: But
" if an unknowing Being, then
" it was impoſſible there ever
" ſhould have been any Know-
" ledge; it being as impoſſible
" that a thing without Knowledge
" ſhould produce it, as that a Tri-
" angle ſhould make it ſelf three
" Angles bigger than two right
" ones. *Allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the Idea, but from the Principles of true Reaſon; as, That no Man can doubt his own Perception; That every thing muſt have a Cauſe; That this Cauſe muſt either have Knowledge or not; if it have, the Point is gained: If it hath not, nothing can produce nothing; and conſequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing.*

Your Lordſhip here contends, That *my Argument is not taken from the Idea, but from true Principles of Reaſon.* I do not ſay, it is *taken from*

from any one Idea, but from all the Ideas concerned in it. But your Lordſhip, if you herein oppoſe any thing I have ſaid, muſt, I humbly conceive, ſay, *Not from Ideas, but from true Principles of Reaſon*; ſeveral whereof your Lordſhip has here ſet down. And whence, I beſeech your Lordſhip, comes the Certainty of any of thoſe Propoſitions, which your Lordſhip calls *true Principles of Reaſon*, but from the perceivable agreement or diſagreement of the Ideas contained in them? Juſt as it is expreſſed in thoſe Propoſitions, *v.g. A Man cannot doubt of his own Perception*, is a true Principle of Reaſon, or a true Propoſition, or a certain Propoſition: But to the Certainty of it we arrive, only by perceiving the neceſſary agreement of the two Ideas of *Perception* and Self-conſciouſneſs.

Again, *Every thing muſt have a Cauſe*: Though I find it ſo ſet down for one by your Lordſhip, yet,

yet, I humbly conceive, is not a true Principle of Reaſon, nor a true Propoſition; but the contrary certain. The Certainty whereof we attain by the Contemplation of our Ideas, and by perceiving that the Idea of Eternity, and the Idea of the Exiſtence of ſomething do agree, and the Idea of Exiſtence from Eternity and of having a Cauſe do not agree, or are inconſiſtent within the ſame thing. But *every Thing that has a beginning muſt have a Cauſe*, is a true Principle of Reaſon, or a Propoſition certainly true; which we come to know by the ſame way, *i. e.* by contemplating our Ideas, and perceiving that the Idea of *beginning to be*, is neceſſarily connected with the Idea of *ſome Operation*; and the Idea of *Operation*, with the Idea of *ſomething Operating*, which we call a Cauſe; and ſo the beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the Idea of a *Cauſe*, as is expreſſed in the Propoſition: And thus it comes to be a certain Propoſition;

and

and ſo may be called a *Principle of Reaſon*, as every true Propoſition is to him, that perceives the Certainty of it.

This, my Lord, is my *way of Ideas*, and of coming to Certainty by them; which, when your Lordſhip has again conſidered, I am apt to think your Lordſhip will no more condemn, than I do except againſt your Lordſhips way of *Arguments* or *Principles of Reaſon*. Nor will it, I ſuppoſe, any longer offend your Lordſhip, under the Notion of a *New way of Reaſoning*, ſince I flatter my ſelf, both theſe ways will be found to be equally old one as the other, tho' perhaps formerly they have not been ſo diſtinctly taken notice of, and the Name of Ideas is of latter Date in our Engliſh Language.

If your Lordſhip ſays, as I think you mean, *viz.* That my *Argument* to prove a God, is *not taken from* Ideas, your Lordſhip will

will pardon me, if I think otherwiſe. For I beſeech your Lordſhip, are not Ideas, whoſe agreement or diſagreement as they are expreſſed in Propoſitions is perceived, immediately or by Intuition, the *Principles of true Reaſon*? And does not the Certainty we have of the Truth of theſe Propoſitions, conſiſt in the Perception of ſuch agreement or diſagreement? And does not the agreement or diſagreement depend upon the Ideas themſelves? Nay, ſo entirely depend upon the Ideas themſelves, that it is impoſſible for the *Mind*, or *Reaſon*, or *Argument*, or any thing to alter it? All that *Reaſon* or the Mind does, in Reaſoning or Arguing, is to find out and obſerve that agreement or diſagreement: And all that Argument does, is by an intervening Idea, to ſhew it, where an immediate putting the Ideas together will not do it.

As for Example, in the preſent Caſe: The Propoſition of whoſe Truth, I would be certain is this.

A

A knowing Being has eternally exiſted. Here the Ideas *joyned*, are *eternal Exiſtence* with a *knowing Being*. But does my mind perceive any immediate connection or repugnancy in theſe Ideas? No. The Propoſition then at firſt view affords me no Certainty; or, as our Engliſh *Idiom* phraſes it, *It is not certain*, or *I am not certain of it*. But though I am not, yet I would be certain whether it be true or no. What then muſt I do? Find Arguments to prove that it is true, or the contrary. And what is that, but to caſt about and find out intermediate Ideas, which may ſhew me the neceſſary connection or inconſiſtency of the Ideas in the Propoſition? Either of which, when by theſe intervening Ideas I am brought to perceive, I am then certain that the Propoſition is true, or I am certain that it is falſe. As in the preſent Caſe, I perceive in my ſelf *Thought* and *Perception*; the Idea of actual *Perception* has an evident connection with

an

an actual Being, that doth perceive and think: The Idea of an actual thinking Being, hath a perceivable connection with the eternal Exiſtence of ſome knowing Being, by the intervention of the negation of all Being, or the Idea of *nothing*, which has a neceſſary connection with *no Power*, *no Operation*, *no Cauſality*, *no Effect*, i. e. with *nothing*. So that the Idea of once actually *nothing*, has a viſible connection with *nothing* to Eternity, for the future; and hence the Idea of an actual Being, is perceived to have a neceſſary connection with ſome actual Being from Eternity. And by the like way of Ideas, may be perceived the actual Exiſtence of a knowing Being, to have a connection with the Exiſtence of an actual knowing Being from Eternity; and the Idea of an eternal, actual, knowing Being, with the Idea of Immateriality, by the intervention of the Idea of Matter, and of its actual Diviſion, Diviſibility and

want

want of Perception, *&c.* which are the Ideas; or, as your Lordſhip is pleaſed to call them, *Arguments*, I make uſe of in this Proof, which I need not here go over again; and which is partly contained in theſe following Words, which your Lordſhip thus quotes out of the 10th Sect. of the ſame Chapter.

P. 251. *Again*, " If we ſuppoſe nothing " to be firſt, Matter can never " begin to be; if bare Matter " without Motion to be eternal, " Motion can never begin to be; " if Matter and Motion be ſup- " poſed eternal, Thought can " never begin to be: For if Mat- " ter could produce Thought, then " Thought muſt be in the Power " of Matter; and if it be in Mat- " ter as ſuch, it muſt be the inſe- " parable Property of all Matter; " which is contrary to the Senſe " and Experience of Mankind. " If only ſome parts of Matter " have a power of Thinking, how " comes

" comes ſo great a difference in the " Properties of the ſame Matter ? " What diſpoſition of Matter is " required to Thinking ? And " from whence comes it ? Of " which no account can be given " in Reaſon. To which your Lordſhip ſubjoins.

This is the Subſtance of the Argument uſed, to prove an infinite, ſpiritual Being, which I am far from weakning the force of: But that which I deſign, is to ſhew, That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct Ideas, *but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it ; which was the Thing I intended to prove.* P. 251.

Your Lordſhip ſays, That *the Certainty of it.* I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means the *Certainty* produced by my Proof of a Deity, *is not placed* upon *clear and diſtinct Ideas.* It is placed, among others, upon the Ideas of *Thinking*, *Exiſtence* and *Matter*, which I think

are all *clear and diſtinct Ideas*; ſo that there are ſome *clear and diſtinct Ideas* in it: And one can hardly ſay there are *not any clear and diſtinct Ideas* in it, becauſe there is one obſcure and confuſed one in it, *viz.* That of *Subſtance*, which yet hinders not the *Certainty* of the Proof.

The Words which your Lordſhip ſubjoins to the former, *viz.*
P. 252. *But upon the force of* REASON *diſtinct from it*, ſeem to me to ſay, as far as I can underſtand them, That the *Certainty* of my *Argument* for a Deity, is *placed not on clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon.*

This, among other Places before ſet down, makes me wiſh your Lordſhip had told us, what you underſtand by *REASON*; for in my acceptation of the Word *REASON*, I do not ſee but the ſame Proof may be placed upon clear and diſtinct Ideas, and upon *Reaſon*

Reaſon too. As I ſaid before, I can perceive no Inconſiſtency or Oppoſition between them, no more than there is any Oppoſition between a clear Object and my Faculty of Seeing, in the Certainty of any thing I receive by my Eyes; for this Certainty may be placed very well on both the clearneſs of the Object, and the exerciſe of that Faculty in me.

Your Lordſhips next Words, I think, ſhould be read thus; *Diſtinct from them:* For if they were intended as they are printed, *Diſtinct from it*, I confeſs I do not underſtand them. *Certainty not placed on clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from them*, my Capacity will reach the Senſe of. But then I cannot but wonder what *diſtinct from them* do there; for I know no Body that does not think that *Reaſon*, or the Faculty of Reaſoning, is *diſtinct from* the Ideas it makes uſe of or is imployed about, whether P. 245.

thoſe *Ideas be clear and diſtinct*, or obſcure and confuſed. But if that Sentence be to be read as it is printed, *viz. The Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it*, I acknowledge your Lordſhips meaning is above my Comprehenſion. Upon the whole matter, my Lord, I muſt confeſs, That I do not ſee that what your Lordſhip ſays you *intended here to prove*, is prov'd, *viz.* That *Certainty* in my proof of a God, *is not placed on Ideas*. And next, if it were prov'd, I do not ſee how it anſwers any *Objection againſt the Trinity, in point of Reaſon.*

Before I go on to what follows, I muſt beg leave to confeſs, I am troubled to find theſe Words of your Lordſhip, among thoſe I have above ſet down out of the
P. 250. foregoing Page, *viz. Allowing the Argument to be good*; and cannot forbear to wiſh, That when your

Lord-

Lordſhip was Writing this Paſſage, you had had in your Mind what you are pleaſed here to ſay, *viz. That you are far from weakning the force of my Argument, which I uſed to prove an infinite, ſpiritual Being.*

My Lord, your Lordſhip is a great Man, not only by the Dignity your Merits are inveſted with, but more by the Merits of your Parts and Learning. Your Lordſhips Words carry Weight and Authority with them; and he that ſhall quote but a Saying or a Doubt of your Lordſhips, that queſtions the force of my Argument for the Proof of a God, will think himſelf well founded and to be hearkened to, as gone a great way in the Cauſe. Theſe words *Allowing the Argument to be good*, in the received way of Speaking, are uſually taken to ſignifie, That he that ſpeaks them, does not judge the *Argument to be good*; but that for Diſcourſe-ſake he at preſent ad-

mits it. Truly, my Lord, till I read theſe Words in your Lordſhip, I always took it for a *good Argument*; and was ſo fully perſwaded of its Goodneſs, that I ſpoke higher of it than of any Reaſoning of mine any where, becauſe I thought it equal to a Demonſtration. If it be not ſo, it is fit I recal my Words, and that I do not betray ſo important and fundamental a Truth, by a weak, but over-valued Argument: And therefore I cannot, upon this Occaſion, but importune your Lordſhip, That if your Lordſhip (as your Words ſeem to intimate) ſees any Weakneſs in it, your Lordſhip would be pleaſed to ſhew it me; that either I may amend that Fault, and make it concluſive, or elſe retract my Confidence, and leave that Cauſe to thoſe who have Strength ſuitable to its Weight. But to return to what follows in your Lordſhips next Paragraph.

2. *The*

2. *The next Thing neceſſary to be cleared in this Diſpute, is, the Diſtinction between Nature and Perſon; and of this we can have no* clear and diſtinct Idea from Senſation or Reflection. *And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right Underſtanding of it. For we muſt talk unintelligibly about this Point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning* Nature *and* Perſon, *and the Grounds of* Identity *and* Diſtinction. *But that theſe come not into our Minds by theſe* ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, *I ſhall now make it appear.* P. 252.

By this it is plain, that the Buſineſs of the following Pages is to make it appear, That *we have no clear and diſtinct Idea of the diſtinction of Nature and Perſon, from* Senſation *or* Reflection: Or, as your Lordſhip expreſſes it a little lower, *The Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the*

Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, come not into our Minds by the ſimple Ideas of Senſation *and* Reflection.

And what, pray my Lord, can be inferr'd from hence, if it ſhould be ſo? Your Lordſhip tells us.

All our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right Underſtanding of the Diſtinction between *Nature* and *Perſon*; *and we muſt talk unintelligibly about this Point, unleſs we have clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction.*

If it be ſo, the Inference I ſhould draw from thence (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this, That it concerns thoſe who write on that Subject to have themſelves, and to lay down to others, *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions*, or Notions, or Ideas, (call them what

what you pleaſe) of what they mean by *Nature* and *Perſon*, and of the *Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction.*

This ſeems, to me, the natural Concluſion flowing from your Lordſhips words; which ſeem here to ſuppoſe *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* (ſomething like *clear and diſtinct Ideas*) neceſſary for the avoiding *unintelligible Talk in the Doctrine of the Trinity.* But I do not ſee how your Lordſhip can, from the neceſſity of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* of *Nature* and *Perſon*, &c. in the *Diſpute* of the *Trinity*, bring in one, who has perhaps miſtaken the way to clear and diſtinct Notions concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*, &c. as fit to be anſwered among thoſe, who bring *Objections againſt the Trinity in point of Reaſon.* I do not ſee why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue againſt his *Eſſay*, in a Chapter that he ſhould write, to anſwer Objections againſt the

the Unity of God, *in point of Reaſon* or Revelation: For upon what Ground ſoever any one writes *in this Diſpute*, or any other, it is not tollerable to talk *unintelligibly* on either ſide.

If by the *way of Ideas*, which is that of the Author of *The Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, a Man cannot come to *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions* concerning *Nature* and *Perſon*; if, as he propoſes from the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, ſuch *Apprehenſions* cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a miſtaken Philoſopher: But it will not follow from thence, That he is not an Orthodox Chriſtian; for he might (as he did) write *his Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, without any Thought of the Controverſie between the Trinitarians and Unitarians: Nay, a Man might have writ all that is in his Book, that never heard one Word of any ſuch Diſpute.

There

There is in the World a great and fierce Conteſt about *Nature* and *Grace*: 'Twould be very hard for me, if I muſt be brought in as a Party on either ſide, becauſe a Diſputant, in that Controverſie, ſhould think the *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of* Nature *and* Grace, *come not into our Minds by the ſimple Ideas of* Senſation *and* Reflection. If this be ſo, I may be reckon'd among the Objectors againſt all Sorts and Points of Orthodoxy, whenever any one pleaſes: I may be called to account as one Heterodox, in the Points of *Free-grace*, *Free-will*, *Predeſtination*, *Original Sin*, *Juſtification by Faith*, *Tranſubſtantiation*, *The Pope's Supremacy*, and what not? as well as in the *Doctrine of the Trinity*; and all becauſe they cannot be furniſhed with clear and diſtinct Notions of *Grace*, *Free-will*, *Tranſubſtantion*, &c. by Senſation or Reflection. For in all theſe, or any other Points, I do not ſee but there

there may be Complaint made, that they have not always a *right Underſtanding* and *clear Notions* of thoſe Things, on which the *Doctrine* they diſpute of, *depends*. And 'tis not altogether unuſual, for Men to *talk unintelligibly* to themſelves and others, in theſe and other *Points* in Controverſie, for want of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions*, or (as I would call them did not your Lordſhip diſlike it) Ideas: For all which unintelligible Talking, I do not think my ſelf accountable, though it ſhould ſo fall out that my way, by Ideas, would not help them to what it ſeems is wanting, *clear and diſtinct* Notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpoſe, they may, for all me, make uſe of any other more ſucceſsful, and leave me out of the Controverſie, as one uſeleſs to either Party, for deciding of the Queſtion.

Suppoſing, as your Lordſhip ſays, and as you have undertaken

to

to *make appear*, That the *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, ſhould not come into the Mind by the ſimple* Ideas *of* Senſation *and* Reflection; what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is this to the Diſpute concerning the *Trinity*, on either ſide? And if, after your Lordſhip has endeavoured to give *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Nature* and *Perſon*, the Diſputants in this Controverſie, ſhould ſtill *talk unintelligibly about this Point*, for want of *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, ought your Lordſhip to be brought in among the Partiſans on the other ſide, by any one who writ *a Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity?* In good earneſt, my Lord, I do not ſee how the *clear and diſtinct* Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, *not coming into the Mind* by the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection, any more contains any *Objection* againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, than *the*

clear

clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions of Original Sin, Juſtification or Tranſubſtantiation, *not coming to the Mind by the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection*, contains any Objection againſt the Doctrine of Original Sin, Juſtification or Tranſubſtantiation, and ſo of all the reſt of the Terms uſed in any Controverſie in Religion; however your Lordſhip, in a Treatiſe *of the Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and in the Chapter where you make it your Buſineſs to anſwer *Objections in point of Reaſon*, ſet your ſelf ſeriouſly to prove, That *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon, and the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, come not into our Minds by theſe ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection.* In order to *the making this appear*, we read as followeth:

P. 252. *As to Nature, that is ſometimes taken for the Eſſential Property of a Thing; as, when we ſay, That ſuch a Thing is of a different Nature from ano-*

another; we mean no more, than that it is differenced by ſuch Properties as come to our Knowledge. Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it ſelf in which theſe Properties are; and ſo Ariſtotle *took Nature for a Corporeal Subſtance, which had the Principles of Motion in it ſelf: But Nature and Subſtance are of an equal extent; and ſo that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties, is the Nature, whether it be meant of bodily or ſpiritual Subſtances.*

Your Lordſhip, in this Paragraph, gives us two Significations of the word *Nature*, 1. That *it is ſometimes taken for Eſſential Properties*, which I eaſily admit. 2. *That ſometimes it is taken for the Thing it ſelf in which theſe Properties are*, and conſequently for *Subſtance* it ſelf. And this your Lordſhip proves out of *Ariſtotle*.

Whether *Ariſtotle* called the Thing it ſelf, wherein the *Eſſential Properties* are, *Nature*, I will not

not Diſpute: But that your Lordſhip thinks fit to call *Subſtance*, *Nature*, is evident: And from thence I think your Lordſhip endeavours to prove, in the following Words, That we can have from *Ideas*, no *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature*. Your Lordſhips Words are,

P. 253. *I grant, That by Senſation and Reflection, we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the* NATURE *of Things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to meer Ideas.*

How we come by the Idea of *Subſtance*, from the ſimple ones of Senſation and Reflection, I have endeavoured to ſhew in another Place; and therefore ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip with here again. But what your Lordſhip infers, in theſe Words, *So that the*

Na-

Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reaſon and not to meer Ideas, I do not well underſtand. Your Lordſhip indeed here again, ſeems to oppoſe *Reaſon* and *Ideas*; and to that I ſay, *meer Ideas* are the Objects of the *Underſtanding*, and *Reaſon* is one of the Faculties of the Underſtanding imploy'd about them; and that the Underſtanding, *or Reaſon*, which ever your Lordſhip pleaſes to call it, makes or forms, out of the ſimple ones that come in by Senſation and Reflection, all the other Ideas; whether general, relative or complex, by abſtracting, comparing and compounding its poſitive, ſimple Ideas, whereof it cannot make or frame any one, but what it receives by Senſation or Reflection. And therefore, I never *denyed that Reaſon* was imploy'd about our particular ſimple Ideas, to make out of them Ideas general, relative and complex; nor about all our Ideas, whether ſimple, or complex; poſitive, or re-

lative; general, or particular: It being the proper Buſineſs of *Reaſon*, in the ſearch after Truth and Knowledge, to find out the Relations between all theſe ſorts of Ideas, in the perception whereof Knowledge and Certainty of Truth conſiſts.

Theſe, my Lord, are, in ſhort, my Notions about Ideas, their Original and Formation, and of the uſe the Mind, or Reaſon, makes of them in Knowledge. Whether your Lordſhip thinks fit to call this *a new way of Reaſoning*, muſt be left to your Lordſhip; whether it be a right way, is that alone which I am concerned for. But your Lordſhip ſeems all along (I crave leave here once for all to take notice of it) to have ſome particular Exception againſt *Ideas*, and particularly *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as if they were not to be uſed, or were of no uſe in *Reaſon* and Knowledge; or, as if *Reaſon* were oppoſed to them, or leads us into

into the Knowledge and Certainty of Things without them: Or, the knowledge of Things did not at all depend on them. I beg your Lordſhips Pardon for expreſſing my ſelf ſo variouſly and doubtfully in this Matter, the Reaſon whereof, is, becauſe I muſt own, That I do not every where clearly underſtand what your Lordſhip means, when you ſpeak, as you do, of *Ideas*; as if I aſcribed more to them, than belonged to them; or expected more of them, than they could do, *v. g.* where your Lordſhip ſays,

But is all this contained in the ſimple Idea of theſe Operations? And P. 241.
again, *So that here it is not the clear-* P. 248.
neſs of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true Ground of Certainty. And farther, *So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themſelves, but from the Evidence of Reaſon.* And in another place, *It is not the Idea that makes us* P. 250.
certain, but the Argument from that

which we perceive in and about our ſelves. Is it from the clear and diſtinct Idea of it? No! but from this Argument. And here, p. 253. *The Nature of Things belongs to our Reaſon, and not to meer Ideas.*

Theſe, and ſeveral the like Paſſages, your Lordſhip has againſt
P. 243. what your Lordſhip calls *This new way of Ideas*, and *an admirable way to bring us to the Certainty of Reaſon.*

I never ſaid nor thought Ideas, or any thing elſe, could *bring us to the Certainty of Reaſon*, without the exerciſe of *Reaſon*. And then, my Lord, if we will imploy our Minds, and exerciſe our Reaſons, to bring us to Certainty; what, I beſeech you, ſhall they be imploy'd about but *Ideas?* For *Ideas*, in my Senſe of the Word, are,
B. 1. C. 1. § 8. " Whatſoever is the Object of the " Underſtanding, when a Man " thinks; *Or*, Whatever it is the " Mind can be imploy'd about in " think-

" thinking. And again, I have
theſe Words, " Whatſoever is the B. 2. c. 8.
" immediate Object of Perception, §. 8.
" Thought or Underſtanding,
" that I call *Idea*. So that my
way of Ideas, and of coming to
Certainty by them, is to imploy
our Minds in thinking upon ſome-
thing; and I do not ſee but your
Lordſhip your ſelf, and every Body
elſe, muſt make uſe of my *way of*
Ideas, unleſs they can find out a
way that will bring them to Cer-
tainty, by thinking on nothing.
So that let *Certainty* be *placed* as
much as it will on *Reaſon*, let the
Nature of Things belong as *properly*
as it will *to our Reaſon*, it will
nevertheleſs be true, That Cer-
tainty conſiſts in the Perception of
the agreement or diſagreement of
Ideas; and that the complex Idea
the word *Nature* ſtands for, is
ultimately made up of the ſimple
Ideas of Senſation and Reflection.
Your Lordſhip proceeds.

P. 253. *But we muſt yet proceed farther: For* Nature *may be conſidered two ways.*

1. *As it is in diſtinct Individuals, as the* Nature *of a* Man *is equally in* Peter, James *and* John; *and this is the* common Nature, *with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them. For the Nature of Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from the ſame Nature, as it is in* James *and* John; *otherwiſe, they would be but* one Perſon, *as well as have the* ſame Nature. *And this diſtinction of* Perſons *in them, is diſcerned both by our* Senſes, *as to their different Accidents; and by our Reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate Exiſtence; not coming into it at once, and in the ſame manner.*

2. Nature *may be conſidered* abſtractly, *without reſpect to individual Perſons; and then it makes an entire Notion of it ſelf. For however the ſame Nature may be in different*

ferent Individuals, yet the Nature in it ſelf remains one and the ſame; which appears from this evident Reaſon, That otherwiſe every Individual muſt make a different kind.

I am ſo little confident of my own Quickneſs, and of having got from what your Lordſhip has ſaid here, a *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion concerning Nature*, that I muſt beg your Lordſhips Pardon if I ſhould happen to diſſatisfie your Lordſhip, by talking *unintelligibly*, or beſides the purpoſe, about it. I muſt then confeſs to your Lordſhip, 1. That I do not clearly underſtand whether your Lordſhip, in theſe two Paragraphs, ſpeaks of *Nature*, as ſtanding for *Eſſential Properties*; or of *Nature*, as ſtanding for *Subſtance*; and yet it is of great moment in the Caſe, becauſe your Lordſhip allows, That the Notion of *Nature* in the former of theſe Senſes, may be had from Senſation and Reflection;

ction; but of *Nature* in the latter Senſe, your Lordſhip ſays, *It properly belongs to Reaſon, and not meer*
P. 253. *Ideas.* 2. Your Lordſhips ſaying in the firſt of theſe Paragraphs, *That the Nature of Man, as in* Peter, *is diſtinct from the ſame Nature as it is in* James *and* John: And in the ſecond of them, *That*
P. 254. *however the SAME Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature it ſelf remains ONE AND THE SAME,* does not give me ſo *clear and diſtinct an Apprehenſion concerning Nature*, that I know which, in your Lordſhips Opinion, I ought to think, either that one *and the ſame Nature* is in *Peter* and *John*; or that a Nature diſtinct from that in *John*, is in *Peter*: And the Reaſon is, becauſe I cannot, in my *way by Ideas*, well put together *one and the ſame* and *diſtinct*. My *Apprehenſion concerning the Nature of Man, or the common Nature of Man*, if your Lordſhip will, upon this Occaſion, give me leave to trouble your Lordſhip with

with it, is, in ſhort, this; That it is a Collection of ſeveral Ideas, combined into one complex, abſtract Idea, which when they are found united in any Individual exiſting, though joined in that Exiſtence with ſeveral other Ideas, that individual or particular Being is truly ſaid to have the Nature of a *Man*, or the Nature of a *Man* to be in him; for as much as all theſe ſimple Ideas are found united in him, which anſwer the complex, abſtract Idea, to which the ſpecifick name *Man* is given by any one; which abſtract, ſpecifick Idea, he keeps the ſame, when he applies the ſpecifick Name, ſtanding for it, to diſtinct Individuals; *i. e.* no Body changes his Idea of a *Man*, when he ſays *Peter* is a *Man*, from that Idea which he makes the name *Man* to ſtand for, when he calls *John* a *Man*. This ſhort way by Ideas, has not, I confeſs, thoſe different, and more learned and ſcholaſtick Conſiderations ſet down by

by your Lordſhip. But how they are neceſſary, or at all tend to prove what your Lordſhip has propoſed to prove, *viz.* That we can have no clear and diſtinct Idea of *Nature*, from the ſimple Ideas got from Senſation and Reflection, I confeſs I do not yet ſee. But your Lordſhip goes on to it,

P. 234. *Let us now ſee how far theſe Things can come from our ſimple Ideas, by Reflection and Senſation. And I ſhall lay down the Hypotheſis of* THOSE, *who reſolve our Certainty into Ideas, as plainly and intelligibly as I can.*

Here I am got again into the Plural Number: For tho' it be ſaid *the Hypotheſis of* THOSE, yet my Words alone are quoted for that *Hypotheſis*, and not a Word of any Body elſe in this whole Buſineſs concerning *Nature*. What they are, I ſhall give the Reader, as your Lordſhip has ſet them down.

1. *We*

1. *We are told,* " That all ſim- Humane Underſt. L. 2. ch. 30, 31.
" ple Ideas are true and adequate.
" Not, that they are the true Re-
" preſentations of Things with-
" out us ; but that they are the
" true Effects of ſuch Powers in
" them, as produce ſuch Senſa-
" tion within us. *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us.*

For theſe Words of mine, I find *Humane Underſtanding*, L. 2. ch. 30, 31. quoted ; but I crave leave to obſerve to your Lordſhip, That in neither of theſe Chapters do I find the Words, as they ſtand here in your Lordſhips Book. In B. 2. Ch. 31. Sect. 2. of my Eſſay, I find theſe Words, " That all our ſim-
" ple Ideas are adequate, becauſe
" being nothing but the Effects
" of certain Powers in things fitted
" or ordained by God, to pro-
" duce ſuch Senſations in us, they
" cannot but be correſpondent and
" ade-

" adequate to those Powers. And in Chap. 30. Sect. 2. I say, That " Our simple Ideas are all real, all " agree to the reality of Things. " Not that they are all of them " the Images or Representations " of what does exist ; the con- " trary whereof in all but the " primary Qualities of Bodies, " hath been already shew'd.

These are the Words in my Book, from whence those in your Lordships seem to be gathered, but with some difference : For I do not remember that I have any where said, of all *our simple Ideas*, That they are none of them *true Representations of Things without us*; as the Words I find in your Lordships Book, seem to make me say. The contrary whereof, appears from the Words which I have set down, out of Chap. 30. where I deny only the simple Ideas of secundary Qualities to be Representations ; but do every where affirm, That the simple

Ideas

Ideas of primary Qualities, are the Images or Repreſentations of what does exiſt without us. So that my Words, in the Chapters quoted by your Lordſhip, not ſaying that all our ſimple Ideas are only *Effects*, and none of them *Repreſentations*, your Lordſhip, I humbly conceive, cannot, upon that Account, infer from my Words, as you do here, *viz. So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them.* P. 245.

The remaining Words of this Sentence, I muſt beg your Lordſhips Pardon, if I profeſs I do not underſtand: They are theſe; *But the Effects they have upon us.* P. 254. *They* here, and *Them* in the preceding Words to which they are joined, ſignifie ſimple Ideas; for 'tis of thoſe your Lordſhip infers, *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us.* And then your Lordſhips Words imports thus

thus much, *ſo that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by* ſimple Ideas, *but the Effects* ſimple Ideas *have upon us*; which I cannot underſtand to be what your Lordſhip intended to infer from the preceding Words taken to be mine. For, I ſuppoſe, your Lordſhip argues, from my Opinion, concerning the ſimple Ideas of ſecundary Qualities, the little real Knowledge we ſhould receive from them, if it be true, that they are not Repreſentations or Images of any thing in Bodies, but only Effects of certain Powers in Bodies to produce them in us: And in that Senſe I take the liberty to read your Lordſhips words thus, *So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by* [theſe Ideas,] *but the Effects* [thoſe Powers] *have upon us.* To which I anſwer,

1. That we as *certainly* know and diſtinguiſh Things by Ideas, ſuppoſing them nothing but Effects produced in us by theſe Powers,

ers, as if they were Repreſentations. I can as *certainly*, when I have occaſion for either, diſtinguiſh Gold from Silver by the Colour; or Wine from Water by the Taſte, if the Colour of the one, or the Taſte of the other, be only an *effect* of their Powers on me; as if that Colour and that Taſte were Repreſentations and Reſemblances of ſomething in thoſe Bodies.

2. I Anſwer; That we have certainly as much Pleaſure and Delight by thoſe Ideas, one way as the other. The ſmell of a Violet or taſte of a Peach, gives me as real and certain Delight, if it be only an Effect, as if it were the true reſemblance of ſomething in that Flower and Fruit. And I a little the more wonder, to hear your Lordſhip complain ſo much of want of *Certainty* in this Caſe, when I read theſe Words of your Lordſhip in another place:

That

P. 256. *That from the Powers and Properties of Things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Eſſence of Things, as thoſe Powers and Properties diſcover. I do not ſay, That we can know all Eſſences of Things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect Underſtanding of all that belong to them: But if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties; What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not ſee the bare* Eſſence *of things. What is that bare* Eſſence, *without the Powers and Properties belonging to it?* It is that internal Conſtitution of Things, from whence thoſe Powers and Properties flow. *Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument, to prove the uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations, about the real* Eſſence *of Things, but it is*

no

no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of ſuch Eſſences. *For although we cannot comprehend the* internal *Frame*, or Conſtitution of Things, *nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance; yet, by them we certainly know, that there are ſuch* Eſſences, *and that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other by their Powers and Properties.*

Give me leave, if your Lordſhip pleaſe, to argue after the ſame manner in the preſent Caſe; *That from* theſe ſimple Ideas which *are knowable by us, we know as much of the* Powers and *Internal* Conſtitutions of Things, as *theſe Powers diſcover; and if we can know ſo much as that there are* ſuch Powers, *and that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch Powers and Properties*, that by theſe ſimple Ideas that are but the Effects

of theſe Powers, we can as certainly diſtinguiſh the Beings wherein thoſe Powers are, and receive as certain Advantage from them, as if thoſe ſimple Ideas were Reſemblances.

What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not ſee that Internal Conſtitution from whence thoſe Powers flow. Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be for any Diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument, to ſhew how ſhort our Philoſophical Speculations are about the real, internal Conſtitutions of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who by thoſe ſimple Ideas ſearch out, find and diſtinguiſh Things for our uſes. *For though,* by thoſe Ideas which are not Reſemblances, *we cannot comprehend the internal Frame or Conſtitution of Things, nor in what man-*

manner theſe Ideas are produced in us, by thoſe Powers; *yet by them we certainly know, That there are ſuch Eſſences or Conſtitutions of theſe Subſtances*, that have thoſe Powers, whereby they regularly produce thoſe Ideas in us; *and that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other by thoſe Powers.*

The next Words your Lordſhip ſets down, as out of my Book, are,

2. " All our Ideas of Sub- P. 254.
" ſtances are imperfect and in-
" adequate, becauſe they refer
" to the real Eſſences of Things
" of which we are ignorant,
" and no Man knows what
" Subſtance is in it ſelf: And
" they are all falſe, when
" look'd on as the Repreſenta-
" tions of the unknown Eſſences
" of Things.

In these too, my Lord, you must give me leave to take Notice, That there is a little variation from my Words: For I do not say, *That all our Ideas of Substances are imperfect and inadequate, because they refer to the real Essences of Things*; for some People may not refer them to *real Essences*. But I do say,

L. 2. c. 21. " That all Ideas of Substances,
" which are referr'd to real
" Essences, are in that respect
" inadequate: As may be seen more at large in that Chapter.

P. 254. Your Lordships next Quotation has in it something of a like Slip. The Words which your Lordship sets down, are,

3. *Abstract Ideas are only general Names, made by separating Circumstances of Time and Place, &c. from*

from them, which are only the Inventions and Creatures of the Underſtanding.

For theſe your Lordſhip quotes Chap. 3. Sect. 6. of my Third Book; where my Words are, " The next Thing to be con- " ſidered, is, how general Words " come to be made. For ſince " all Things that exiſt, are on- " ly Particulars, how come we " by general Terms? Or where " find we thoſe general Na- " tures they are ſuppoſed to " ſtand for? Words become ge- " neral, by being made Signs of " general Ideas; and Ideas be- " come general, by ſeparating " from them the Circumſtances " of Time or Place, and any " other Ideas that may deter- " mine them to this or that " particular Exiſtence. By this " way of Abſtraction, they are " made capable of repreſenting

" more Individuals than one; " each of which, having in it a " Conformity to that abſtract " Idea, is (as we call it) of that " ſort. By which Words it appears, that I am far enough from ſaying, *That abſtract Ideas are* P. 255. *only general Names.* Your Lordſhips next Quotation out of my Book, is,

4. " Eſſence may be taken " two ways. 1. For the real, " internal, unknown Conſtitutions of Things; and in this " Senſe it is underſtood as to " particular Things. 2. For " the abſtract Idea; and one is " ſaid to be the Nominal, the " other the real Eſſence. And " the Nominal Eſſences only " are immutable, and are " Helps to enable them to conſider Things, and to diſcourſe " of them.

Here

Here too, I think, there are ſome Words left out, which are neceſſary to make my Meaning clearly underſtood; which your Lordſhip will find, if you think fit to give your ſelf the trouble to caſt your Eye again on that Chapter, which you here quote. But not diſcerning clearly what uſe your Lordſhip makes of them, as they are either in your Lordſhips Quotation, or in my Book, I ſhall not trouble your Lordſhip about them. Your Lordſhip goes on,

But two Things are granted, which tend to clear this Matter. P. 255.

1. *That there is a* real Eſſence, *which is the Foundation of Powers and Properties.*

2. *That we may know theſe Powers and Properties, although we are ignorant of the real Eſſence.*

If by that indefinite Expreſſion, *We may know theſe Powers and Properties*, your Lordſhip means, *That we may know ſome of the Powers and Properties that* depend on the real Eſſences of Subſtances, I grant it to be my meaning; if your Lordſhip, in thoſe Words, comprehends all their *Powers and Properties*, that goes beyond my meaning. From theſe two Things, which I grant your Lordſhip ſays, you infer,

P. 255. 1. *That from thoſe true and adequate Ideas, which we have of the Modes and Properties of Things, we have ſufficient Certainty of the real Eſſence of them: For theſe Ideas are allowed to be true; and either by them we may judge of the Truth of Things; or we can make no Judgment at all of any thing without our Selves.*

If

If our Ideas be only the Effects we ſee of the Powers of Things without us; yet our Reaſon muſt be ſatisfied, That there could be no ſuch Powers, unleſs there were ſome real Beings which had them. So that either we may be certain, by theſe Effects, of the real Being of Things; or it is not poſſible, as we are framed, to have any Certainty at all of any thing without our Selves.

All this, if I miſtake not your Lordſhip, is only to prove, That by the Ideas of *Properties* and *Powers* which we obſerve in Things, *our Reaſon muſt be ſatisfied that there are without us real Beings, with real Eſſences*; which being that which I readily own and have ſaid in my Book, I cannot but acknowledge my ſelf obliged to your Lordſhip, for being at the Pains to collect Places

Places out of my Book to prove what I hold in it; and the more becauſe your Lordſhip does it by ways and ſteps, which poſſibly I ſhould never have thought of. Your Lordſhips next Inference, is,

P. 256. 2. *That from the Powers and Properties of Things, which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Eſſence of Things, as thoſe Powers and Properties diſcover. I do not ſay, That we can know all Eſſences of Things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect Underſtanding of all that belong to them: But if we can know ſo much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties; what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not ſee the* bare Eſſence of Things. *What is* that bare Eſſence *without*

out the Powers and Properties *belonging to it?* It *is that* internal Conſtitution of Things, *from whence thoſe Powers and Properties flow. Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Diſcoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument to prove the uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations, about the real Eſſences of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who inquire after the Certainty of ſuch Eſſences. For although we cannot comprehend the* internal Frame or Conſtitution of Things, *nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance; yet, by them, we certainly know that there are ſuch Eſſences, and that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other by their Powers and Properties.*

This ſecond Inference, ſeems to be nothing but a Reproof to thoſe who *complain, That they do not*

not ſee the bare Eſſences of Things. Complaining that God did not make us otherwiſe than he has, and with larger Capacities than he has thought fit to give us, is, I confeſs, a Fault worthy of your Lordſhips Reproof. But to ſay, That if we knew the real Eſſences or internal Conſtitutions of thoſe Beings, ſome of whoſe Properties we know, we ſhould have much more certain Knowledge concerning thoſe Things and their Properties I am ſure is true, and I think no faulty *complaining*; and if it be, I muſt own my ſelf to your Lordſhip to be one of thoſe Complainers.

But your Lordſhip asks, *What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things?*

If your Lordſhip means, as your Words ſeem to import, *What is it*

it we complain of, in order to our Certainty, that thoſe Properties are the Properties of ſome *Beings*, or that ſomething does exiſt when thoſe Properties exiſt? I anſwer; *We complain of the want of* nothing *in order to that Certainty*, or ſuch a *Certainty* as that is. But there are other very deſirable *Certainties*, or other parts of Knowledge concerning the ſame Things, which we may want when we have thoſe Certainties. Knowing the Colour, Figure and Smell of Hyſop, *I can*, when I ſee Hyſop, *know ſo much, as that there is a certain Being in the World, endued with ſuch diſtinct Powers and Properties*; and yet I may juſtly *complain*, that I want ſomething *in order to Certainty*, that Hyſop will cure a Bruiſe or a Cough, or that it will kill Moths; or, uſed in a certain way, harden Iron; or an hundred other uſeful Properties that may be in it, which I ſhall never know;

know; and yet might be certain of, if I knew the real Eſſences, or internal Conſtitution of Things, on which all their Properties depend.

Your Lordſhip agreeing with me, That the real *Eſſence is that internal Conſtitution of Things, from whence their Powers and Properties flow*, adds farther; *Suppoſe we be ignorant of this* [Eſſence], *as we are like to be for any Diſcoveries have been yet made, that is a good Argument to prove the uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations about the real Eſſences of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of ſuch Eſſences.*

I know no Body that ever denied the Certainty of ſuch *real Eſſences* or *internal Conſtitutions*, in Things that do exiſt, if it be that

that that your Lordſhip means by *Certainty of ſuch Eſſences*. If it be any other *Certainty* that your Lordſhip *enquires after*, relating to *ſuch Eſſences*, I confeſs I know not what it is, ſince your Lordſhip acknowledges, *We are ignorant of thoſe real Eſſences, thoſe internal Conſtitutions, and are like to be ſo*; and ſeem to think it the uncurable Cauſe of *uncertainty in Philoſophical Speculations*.

Your Lordſhip adds, *For although we cannot comprehend the internal Frame and Conſtitution of Things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance*.

Here I muſt acknowledge to your Lordſhip, That my Notion of theſe Eſſences differs a little from your Lordſhips; for I do not take them to *flow* from the

the Subſtance in any created Being, but to be in every thing that *internal Conſtitution*, or Frame, or Modification of the *Subſtance*, which God in his Wiſdom and good Pleaſure thinks fit to give to every particular Creature, when he gives it a Being: And ſuch *Eſſences* I grant there are in all Things that exiſt. Your Lordſhips Third Inference begins thus:

P. 257. 3. *The Eſſences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them: For they are founded on the natural Conſtitution of Things.*

I think the real *Eſſences of Things* are not ſo much founded on, as that they are the very real *Conſtitution of Things*, and therefore I eaſily grant there is *Reality* in them; and 'twas from that

Reality

Reality that I called them *real Eſſences.* But yet from hence, I cannot agree to what follows.

And however the abſtracted Ideas are the Work of the Mind, yet they are not meer Creatures of the Mind; as appears by an inſtance produced of the " Eſſence of the Sun, " being in one ſingle Individual, " *in which caſe it is granted* ; " That the Idea may be ſo ab- " ſtracted, that more Suns might " agree in it, and it is as much " a Sort, as if there were as ma- " ny Suns as there are Stars. *So that here we have a real Eſſence ſubſiſting in one Individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and the ſame Eſſence remaining. But in this one Sun there is a real Eſſence, and not a meer nominal or abſtracted Eſſence : But ſuppoſe there were more Suns ; would not each of them have the real Eſſence of the Sun? For what is it* P. 257.

makes the ſecond Sun, but having the ſame real Eſſence with the firſt? If it were but a nominal Eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but the Name.

This, my Lord, as I underſtand it, is to prove, That the abſtract general Eſſence of any Sort of Things, or Things of the ſame Denomination *v. g.* of *Man* or *Marygolds*, hath a *real Being* out of the Underſtanding; which I confeſs, my Lord, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordſhips Proof here brought out of my *Eſſay*, concerning the *Sun*, I humbly conceive will not reach it: Becauſe what is ſaid there, does not at all concern the *real* but nominal *Eſſence*; as is evident from hence, That the *Idea* I ſpeak of there is, a *Complex* Idea; but we have no *Complex Idea* of the internal Conſtitution, or real Eſſence, of the Sun.

Sun. Beſides, I ſay expreſly, That our diſtinguiſhing Subſtances into Species, by Names, is not at all founded on their real Eſſences. So that the Sun being one of theſe Subſtances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your Lordſhip, be ſuppoſed to mean by *Eſſence of the Sun*, the real Eſſence of the Sun, unleſs I had ſo expreſſed it. But all this Argument will be at an end, when your Lordſhip ſhall have explained what you mean by theſe Words, *True Sun*. In my Senſe of them, any thing will be a *True Sun*, to which the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd; and to that Subſtance or Thing, the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd, which has united in it that combination of ſenſible Qualities, by which any thing elſe that is called *Sun* is diſtinguiſhed from other Subſtances, *i. e.* by the *Nominal Eſſence*: And thus

our *Sun* is denominated and diſtinguiſhed from a fixed Star; not by a *real Eſſence* that we do not know, (for if we did, 'tis poſſible we ſhould find the *real Eſſence* or *Conſtitution* of one of the fixed Stars, to be the ſame with that of our *Sun)* but by a complex Idea of ſenſible Qualities co-exiſting, which, wherever they are found, *make a true Sun.* And thus I crave leave to anſwer your Lordſhips Queſtion, *For what is it makes the ſecond Sun to be a true Sun, but having the ſame real Eſſence with the firſt? If it were but a nominal Eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but the Name.*

I humbly conceive, if it had the *Nominal Eſſence*, it would have ſomething beſides *the Name, viz.* That *Nominal Eſſence*, which is ſufficient to denominate it truly a *Sun*, or to make it be a

true

true Sun, though we know nothing of that real Eſſence whereon that Nominal One depends; your Lordſhip will then argue, That that *real Eſſence* is in the *ſecond Sun*, and *makes the ſecond Sun*. I grant it, when the *ſecond Sun* comes to exiſt, ſo as to be perceived by us to have all the Ideas contained in our complex Idea, *i. e.* in our *Nominal Eſſence* of a *Sun*. For ſhould it be true, (as is now believed by Aſtronomers) that the real Eſſence of the Sun were in any of the fixed Stars, yet ſuch a Star could not for that, be by us called a *Sun*, whilſt it anſwers not our complex Idea or nominal Eſſence of a *Sun*. But how far that will prove, *That the Eſſences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them*, diſtinct from that of *abſtract Ideas* in the Mind, which are *meerly Creatures of the Mind*, I do not ſee; and we ſhall farther enquire, in conſi-

dering your Lordſhips following Words.

P. 258. *Therefore there muſt be a real Eſſence in every Individual of the ſame kind.* Yes, and I beg leave of your Lordſhip to ſay, of a different *kind* too. *For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is.*

That every individual Subſtance, has a real, internal, individual Conſtitution, *i. e.* a *real Eſſence*, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your Lordſhip ſays,

P. 258. Peter, James *and* John, *are all true and real Man:* Without doubt, ſuppoſing them to be *Men*, they *are true and real Men*, *i. e.* ſuppoſing the Name of that Species belongs to them. And ſo

ſo three *Bobaques* are all true and and real *Bobaques*, ſuppoſing the Name of that Species of Animals belongs to them.

For I beſeech your Lordſhip to conſider, whether in your way of Arguing, by naming them *Peter*, *James* and *John*, Names familiar to us, as appropriated to Individuals of the Species *Man*, your Lordſhip does not firſt ſuppoſe them *Men*; and then very ſafely ask, Whether they be not *all true and real Men?* But if I ſhould ask your Lordſhip, Whether *Weweena*, *Chuckerey* and *Couſheda*, were true and real Men or no? Your Lordſhip would not be able to tell me, till I having pointed out to your Lordſhip the Individuals called by thoſe Names, your Lordſhip by examining whether they had in them thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which your Lordſhip has com-

bined into that complex Idea, to which you give the ſpecifick name *Man*, determin'd them all, or ſome of them, to be of the Species which you call *Man*, and ſo to be *true and real Men*; which when your Lordſhip has determin'd, 'tis plain you did it by that which is only the Nominal Eſſence, as not knowing the *real* one. But your Lordſhip farther asks,

P. 258. *What is it makes* Peter, James *and* John, *real Men? Is it the attributing the general Name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real Eſſence of a Man is in every one of them.*

If when your Lordſhip asks, What *makes them Men?* Your Lordſhip uſed the Word *making* in the proper Senſe for the efficient Cauſe, and in that Senſe it were

were true, That the Eſſence of a Man, *i. e.* the ſpecifick Eſſence of that Species made a Man; it would undoubtedly follow, That this ſpecifick Eſſence had a reality beyond that of Being only a general, abſtract Idea in the Mind. But when it is ſaid, That it is the *true and real Eſſence of a Man in every one of them, that makes* Peter, James *and* John, *true and real Men*; the true and real meaning of theſe Words is no more, but that the Eſſence of that Species, *i. e.* the Properties anſwering the complex, abſtract Idea, to which the ſpecifick Name is given, being found in them that makes them be properly and truly called Men, or is the Reaſon why they are called Men. Your Lordſhip adds,

And we muſt be as certain of this, as we are that they are Men. P. 258.

How,

How, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are we certain, That they are *Men*, but only by our Senſes, finding thoſe Properties in them which anſwer the abſtract, complex Idea, which is in our Minds of the ſpecifick Idea, to which we have annexed the ſpecifick name *Man?* This I take to be the true meaning of what your Lordſhip ſays in the next
P. 258. Words, *viz. They take their denomination of being Men, from that common Nature or Eſſence which is in them*; and I am apt to think, theſe Words will not hold true in any other Senſe.

Your Lordſhips Fourth Inference begins thus:

P. 258. *That the general Idea is not made from the ſimple Ideas, by the meer Act of the Mind abſtracting from*

from Circumſtances, but from Reaſon and Conſideration of the Nature of Things.

I thought, my Lord, That *Reaſon* and *Conſideration* had been *Acts of the Mind, meer Acts of the Mind*, when any thing was done by them. Your Lordſhip gives a Reaſon for it, *viz.*

For when we ſee ſeveral Individuals that have the ſame Powers and Properties, we thence infer, That there muſt be ſomething common to all, which makes them of one kind. P. 258.

I grant the Inference to be true; but muſt beg leave to deny that this proves, That the general Idea the Name is annexed to, is not made by the Mind. I have ſaid, and it agrees with what

what your Lordſhip here ſays,

B. 3. c. 6. §. 28, 29. That " the Mind, in making " its complex Ideas of Subſtances, " only follows Nature, and puts " no Ideas together, which are " not ſuppoſed to have an Uni- " on in Nature; no Body joins " the Voice of a Sheep, with " the Shape of an Horſe; nor " the Colour of Lead, with the " Weight and Fixedneſs of " Gold, to be the complex " Ideas of any real Subſtances; " unleſs he has a Mind to fill his " Head with Chimeras, and " his Diſcourſe with unintelli- " gible Words. Men obſerv- " ing certain Qualities always " joined and exiſting together, " therein copied Nature, and of " Ideas ſo united, made their com- " plex Ones of Subſtances, *&c.* Which is very little different from what your Lordſhip here ſays, That 'tis from our Obſervation of *Individuals*, that we come to *infer, That there is ſome-*

thing

thing common to them all. But I do not ſee how it will thence follow, that the *general* or ſpecifick Idea is not made by the meer Act of the Mind. No, ſays your Lordſhip.

There is ſomething common to them all, which makes them of one Kind; and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them all of one Kind muſt not be a nominal, *but* real Eſſence. P. 259.

This may be ſome Objection to the Name of *Nominal Eſſence*; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the Thing deſigned by it. There is an internal Conſtitution of Things, on which their Properties depend. This your Lordſhip and I are agreed of, and this we call the *real Eſſence.* There are alſo certain Complex Ideas, or Combinations

ons of these Properties in Mens Minds, to which they commonly annex specifick Names, or Names of sorts or *kinds* of Things. This, I believe, your Lordship does not deny. These complex Ideas, for want of a better Name, I have called *Nominal Essences*; how properly, I will not dispute. But if any one will help me to a better Name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then I must, to express my self, use this. Now, my Lord, *Body*, *Life* and the Power of *Reasoning*, being not the *real* Essence of a *Man*, as I believe your Lordship will agree; will your Lordship say, That they are not enough to make the Thing wherein they are found of the kind called *Man*, and not of the kind called Baboon, because the *difference of these Kinds is real?* If this be not real enough to make the *Thing of one kind* and *not of another*, I do not see how

how *Animal rationale* can be enough *really* to diſtinguiſh a *Man* from an *Horſe*: For that is but the *nominal*, not *real Eſſence* of that kind, deſigned by the name *Man*. And yet, I ſuppoſe, every one thinks it *real* enough, to make a *real difference* between that and other *Kinds*. And if nothing will ſerve the turn, to MAKE Things *of one Kind and not of another*, (which as I have ſhew'd, ſignifies no more but ranking of them under different ſpecifick Names) but their real, unknown Conſtitutions, which are the *real Eſſences* we are ſpeaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we ſhould have really different kinds of Subſtances, or diſtinct Names for them, unleſs we could diſtinguiſh them by theſe Differences, of which we have no diſtinct Conceptions. For I think it would not be readily

anſwer'd

anſwer'd me, if I ſhould demand, Wherein lies the *real difference* in the internal Conſtitution of a *Stag* from that of a *Buck*, which are each of them very well known to *be of one Kind*, and not *of the other*; and no Body queſtions but that the *Kinds* whereof each of them is, are *really different*. Your Lordſhip farther ſays,

P. 259. *And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Subſtances, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds.*

I confeſs, my Lord, I know not what to ſay to this, becauſe I do not know what theſe *Complex Ideas* of Subſtances are, *whereby* Men arbitrarily joyn Modes together in their Minds. But I am apt to think there is

is a Miſtake in the Matter, by the Words that follow, which are theſe :

For let them miſtake in their Complication of Ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they pleaſe, the real Eſſence of a Man, and an Horſe, and a Tree, are juſt what they were. P. 259.

The Miſtake I ſpoke of, I humbly ſuppoſe is this, That Things are here taken to be diſtinguiſhed by their *real Eſſences*; when by the very way of ſpeaking of them, it is clear, That they are already diſtinguiſhed by their nominal Eſſences, and are ſo taken to be. For what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, does your Lordſhip mean, when you ſay, The *real Eſſence*

of a Man, and an Horſe, and a Tree, but that there are ſuch *Kinds* already ſet out by the ſignification of theſe names *Man, Horſe, Tree?* And what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, is the Signification of each of theſe ſpecifick Names, but the complex Idea that it ſtands for? And that complex Idea is the nominal Eſſence, and nothing elſe. So that taking *Man*, as your Lordſhip does here, to ſtand for a kind or ſort of Individuals, all which agree in that common, complex Idea, which that ſpecifick Name ſtands for, it is certain that the real Eſſence of all the Individuals, comprehended under the ſpecifick name *Man*, in your uſe of it, would be juſt the ſame, let others leave out or put into their complex Idea of *Man* what they pleaſe; becauſe the real Eſſence on which that unalter'd complex Idea, *i. e.* thoſe Pro-

Properties depend, muſt neceſſarily be concluded to be the ſame.

For I take it for granted, That in uſing the Name *Man*, in this place, your Lordſhip uſes it for that complex Idea which is in your Lordſhips Mind of that Species. So that your Lordſhip, by putting it for or ſubſtituting it in the place of that complex Idea, where you ſay the *real Eſſence* of it is *juſt as it was*, or the very ſame it was, does ſuppoſe the Idea it ſtands for, to be ſteadily the ſame. For if I change the Signification of the word *Man*, whereby it may not comprehend juſt the ſame Individuals which in your Lordſhips Senſe it does, but ſhut out ſome of thoſe that to your Lordſhip are *Men* in your ſignification of the word *Man*, or take in others

to which your Lordſhip does not allow the name *Man*. I do not think your Lordſhip will ſay, That the real Eſſence of *Man*, in both theſe Senſes, is the ſame; and yet your Lordſhip ſeems to ſay ſo, when you ſay, *Let Men miſtake in the Complication of their Ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they pleaſe, the real Eſſence* of the Individuals comprehended under the Names annexed to theſe Ideas, will be the ſame: For ſo, I humbly conceive, it muſt be put, to make out what your Lordſhip aims at. For as your Lordſhip puts it by the Name of *Man*, or any other ſpecifick Name, your Lordſhip ſeems to me to ſuppoſe, that that Name ſtands for, and not for the ſame Idea, at the ſame time.

For

For Example, my Lord, let your Lordſhips Idea, to which you annex the Sign *Man*, be a rational Animal: Let another Mans Idea be a rational Animal of ſuch a Shape; let a third Mans Idea be of an Animal of ſuch a Size and Shape, leaving out Rationality; let a fourths be an Animal with a Body of ſuch a Shape, and an immaterial Subſtance, with a Power of Reaſoning: Let a fifth leave out of his Idea, an immaterial Subſtance. 'Tis plain every one of theſe will call his a *Man*, as well as your Lordſhip; and yet 'tis as plain that *Man*, as ſtanding for all theſe diſtinct, complex Ideas, cannot be ſuppoſed to have the ſame internal Conſtitution, *i. e.* the ſame *real Eſſence*. The Truth is, every diſtinct, abſtract Idea, with a Name to it, makes a real, diſtinct Kind, whatever the *real-*

Eſſence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true, what your Lordſhip ſays in the
P. 259. next Words, *And let the nominal Eſſences differ never ſo much, the real, common Eſſence or Nature of the ſeveral Kinds, are not at all alter'd by them*, i. e. That our Thoughts or Ideas cannot alter the real Conſtitutions that are in Things that exiſt, there is nothing more certain. But yet 'tis true, That the change of Ideas to which we annex them, can and does alter the ſignification of their Names, and thereby alter the Kinds, which by theſe Names we rank and ſort them into. Your Lordſhip farther adds,

P. 259. *And theſe real Eſſences are unchangeable*, i. e. the internal Con-

Conſtitutions *are unchangeable*. Of what, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are the *internal Conſtitutions unchangeable?* Not of any Thing that exiſts, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as eaſily by that Hand that made them, as the internal Frame of a Watch. What then is it that is *unchangeable?* The internal Conſtitution or real Eſſence of a Species: Which, in plain Engliſh, is no more but this, whilſt the ſame ſpecifick Name, *v. g.* of *Man*, *Horſe* or *Tree*, is annexed to or made the Sign of the ſame abſtract, complex Idea, under which I rank ſeveral Individuals, it is impoſſible but the real Conſtitution on which that unalter'd, complex Idea, or nominal Eſſence depends, muſt be the ſame, *i. e.* in other Words, where we find all the ſame Properties, we have Reaſon to conclude there is the ſame real, in-

ternal Conſtitution, from which thoſe Properties flow.

But your Lordſhip proves the real Eſſences to be unchangeable, becauſe God makes them, in theſe following Words:

P. 259. *For however there may happen ſome variety in Individuals by particular Accidents, yet the Eſſences of Men, and Horſes, and Trees, remain always the ſame; becauſe they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made ſeveral ſorts of Beings.*

'Tis true, the real Conſtitutions or Eſſences of particular Things exiſting, *do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator*; but their being ranked into ſorts, under ſuch

ſuch and ſuch Names, does depend, and wholly depend upon the *Ideas* of Men.

Your Lordſhip here ending your four Inferences, and all your Diſcourſe about *Nature*; you come, in the next Place, to treat of *Perſon*, concerning which your Lordſhip diſcourſeth thus:

2. *Let us now come to the Idea of a Perſon. For although the common Nature in Mankind be the ſame, yet we ſee a difference in the ſeveral Individuals, from one another: So that* Peter, *and* James *and* John, *are all of the ſame kind; yet* Peter *is not* James, *and* James *is not* John. *But what is this Diſtinction founded upon? They may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by our Senſes as to difference of Features, diſtance* P. 259.

ſtance of Place, &c. *but that is not all*; *for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame Nature. And here lies the true common Idea of a Perſon, which ariſes from that manner of Subſiſtence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. An individual, intelligent Subſtance, is rather ſuppoſed to the making of a Perſon, than the proper Deſinition of it*; *for a Perſon relates to ſomething, which doth diſtinguiſh it from another intelligent Subſtance in the ſame Nature*; *and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subſiſtence, which agrees to one, and to none elſe of the Kind*; *and this is it which is called Perſonality.*

And then your Lordſhip asks, *But how do our ſimple Ideas help*

help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Perſon?

If *Nature* and *Perſon* are taken for Two real Beings, that do or can exiſt any where, without any relation to theſe two Names, I muſt confeſs I do not ſee how *ſimple* Ideas, or any Thing elſe, *can help us out in this Matter*; nor can we from *ſimple Ideas*, or any Thing elſe that I know, *learn the difference* between them, nor what they are.

The Reaſon why I ſpeak thus, is, becauſe your Lordſhip, in your fore-cited Words, ſays, *Here lies the true Idea of a Perſon*; and in the foregoing Diſcourſe ſpeak of *Nature*, as if it were ſome ſteady, eſtabliſhed Being,

Being, to which one certain precise Idea necessarily belongs to make it a *true Idea*; whereas, my Lord, *in the way of Ideas*, I begin at the other end, and think that the word *Person* in it self signifies nothing; and so no Idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the *true Idea* of it. But as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the *true Idea of a Person*, and so of *Nature*; but because the propriety of Language, *i. e.* the precise Idea that every Word stands for, is not always exactly known, but is often disputed, there is no other way for him that uses a Word which is in Dispute, but to define what he signifies by it; and then the Dispute can be no longer verbal, but must necessarily be about the Idea which he tells us he puts it for.

Taking

Taking therefore *Nature* and *Perſon* for the Signs of two Ideas they are put to ſtand for, there is nothing, I think, that helps us ſo ſoon, nor ſo well to find the difference of *Nature* and *Perſon*, as *ſimple Ideas*; for by enumerating all the ſimple Ideas, that are contained in the complex Idea that each of them is made to ſtand for, we ſhall immediately ſee the whole difference that is between them.

Far be it from me to ſay there is no other way but this; your Lordſhip propoſing to *clear the diſtinction* between *Nature* and *Perſon*, and having declared, *We can have no clear and diſtinct Idea of it by Senſation or Reflection*, and that *the Grounds of Identity and Diſtinction, come not into our Minds by the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection*, gave me

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me hopes of getting ſome farther Inſight into theſe Matters, ſo as to have more *clear and diſtinct Apprehenſions concerning Nature and Perſon*, than was to be had by *Ideas*. But after having, with Attention, more than once read over what your Lordſhip, with ſo much Application, has writ thereupon; I muſt, with regret, confeſs, That the Way is too delicate, and the Matter too abſtruſe, for my Capacity; and that I have learned nothing out of your Lordſhips elaborate Diſcourſe, but this, That I muſt content my ſelf with the condemn'd *way by Ideas*, and deſpair of ever attaining any Knowledge by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it.

The remaining part of the Chapter, containing no Remarks of your Lordſhip, upon any thing

thing in my Book, I am glad I have no occaſion to give your Lordſhip any farther Trouble, but only to beg your Lordſhips Pardon for this, and to aſſure your Lordſhip that I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordſhips

Moſt humble and

Moſt obedient Servant,

John Locke.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

My LORD,

UPON a Review of these Papers, I can hardly forbear wondering at my self what I have been doing in them; since I can scarce find upon what Ground this Controversie with me stands, or whence it rose, or whether it tends. And I should certainly repent my Pains in it, but that I conclude that your Lordship, who does not throw away your Time upon slight Matters and Things of small moment, having a quicker Sight and larger Views than I have, would not have troubled your self so much with my Book, as to bestow Seven and Twenty Pages together of a very learned Treatise, and that on a very weighty Subject; and in those Twenty

Twenty ſeven Pages, bring Seven and twenty Quotations out of my Book, unleſs there were ſomething in it wherein it is very material that the World ſhould be ſet right; which is what I earneſtly deſire ſhould be done. And to that purpoſe alone, have taken the liberty to trouble your Lordſhip with this Letter.

If I have any where omitted any Thing of moment in your Lordſhips Diſcourſe concerning my Notions, or any where miſtaken your Lordſhips Senſe in what I have taken notice of, I beg your Lordſhips Pardon; with this Aſſurance, That it was not wilfully done. And if any where, in the warm purſuit of an Argument, over-attention to the Matter ſhould have made me let ſlip any Form of Expreſſion, in the leaſt Circumſtance not carrying with it the utmoſt Marks of that Reſpect that I

acknowledge due, and ſhall always pay to your Lordſhips Perſon and known great Learning, I diſown it; and deſire your Lordſhip to look on it as not coming from my Intention, but Inadvertency.

No Bodies Notions, I think, are the better or truer, for ill Manners joined with them; and I conclude your Lordſhip, who ſo well knows the different Caſt of Mens Heads, and of the Opinions that poſſeſs them, will not think it ill Manners in any one, if his Notions differ from your Lordſhips, and that he owns that difference, and explains the Grounds of it as well as he can. I have always thought, That Truth and Knowledge, by the ill and over-eager management of Controverſies, loſe a great deal of the Advantages they might receive, from the variety of Conceptions there is in Mens Underſtandings. Could the Heats

Heats, and Paſſion, and ill Language be left out of them, they would afford great Improvements to thoſe who could ſeparate them from by Intereſts and Perſonal Prejudices. Theſe I look upon your Lordſhip to be altogether above.

It is not for me who have ſo mean a Talent in it my ſelf, to preſcribe to any one how he ſhould Write; for when I have ſaid all I can, he, 'tis like, will follow his own Method, and perhaps cannot help it. Much leſs would it be good Manners in me, to offer any Thing that way to a Perſon of your Lordſhips high Rank above me in Parts and Learning, as well as Place and Dignity. But yet your Lordſhip will excuſe it to my ſhort-ſightedneſs, if I wiſh ſometimes that your Lordſhip would have been pleaſed, in this Debate, to have kept every ones part ſeparate to himſelf, that

what I am concerned in, might not have been ſo mingled with the Opinions of others, which are no Tenets of mine, nor, as I think, does what I have written any way relate to; but that I, and every one, might have ſeen who your Lordſhips Arguments bore upon, and what Intereſt he had in the Controverſie, and how far. At leaſt, my Lord, give me leave to wiſh, That your Lordſhip had ſhewn what Connection any Thing I have ſaid about *Ideas*, and particularly about the *Idea of Subſtance*, about the poſſibility *that God, if he pleaſed, might indue ſome Syſtems of Matter with a Power of Thinking*; or what I have ſaid to *prove a God*, &c. has with any *Objections*, that are made by others, againſt *the Doctrine of the Trinity*, or againſt *Myſteries*: For many Paſſages concerning *Ideas*, *Subſtances*, the poſſibility of Gods beſtowing *Thought* on ſome Syſtems

ſtems of Matter, and the *proof of a God*, &c. your Lordſhip has quoted out of my Book, in a Chapter wherein your Lordſhip profeſſes to anſwer *Objections againſt the Trinity, in point of Reaſon*. Had I been able to diſcover in theſe Paſſages of my Book, quoted by your Lordſhip, what tendency your Lordſhip had obſerved in them to any ſuch *Objections*, I ſhould perhaps have troubled your Lordſhip with leſs impertinent Anſwers. But the uncertainty I was very often in, to what purpoſe your Lordſhip brought them, may have made my Explications of my ſelf leſs appoſite, than what your Lordſhip might have expected. If your Lordſhip had ſhewed me any thing in my Book, that contained or implied any oppoſition in it to any Thing revealed in Holy Writ concerning the *Trinity*, or any other Doctrine contained in the Bible, I ſhould have

have been thereby obliged to your Lordſhip for freeing me from that Miſtake, and for affording me an opportunity to own to the World that Obligation, by publickly retracting my Error. For I know not any thing more diſingenious, than not publickly to own a Conviction one has received concerning any Thing erroneous in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater Offence againſt Mankind, than to propagate a Falſhood whereof one is convinced, eſpecially in a Matter wherein Men are highly concerned not to be miſled.

The Holy Scripture is to me, and always will be, the conſtant Guide of my Aſſent; and I ſhall always hearken to it, as containing infallible Truth, relating to Things of the higheſt Concernment. And I wiſh I could ſay, there were no Myſteries in it: I acknowledge there are

are to me, and I fear always will be. But where I want the Evidence of Things, there yet is Ground enough for me to believe, becauſe God has ſaid it: And I ſhall preſently condemn and quit any Opinion of mine, as ſoon as I am ſhewn that it is contrary to any Revelation in the Holy Scripture. But I muſt confeſs to your Lordſhip, That I do not yet perceive any ſuch Contrariety in any Thing in my *Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*.

Oates, Jan. 7.
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